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 Richard Nixon thought everyone ought to be more civil. According to Yale historian and 
leading grand strategy scholar John Lewis Gaddis, that was Nixon’s grand strategy: that he and 
his administration could “convince Kremlin leaders that it was in their country’s interest to be 
‘contained’” by entangling the Soviet Union in “the existing world order.” Once the Soviets 
became invested in maintaining global stability, their confrontation with the United States would 
fade and the Cold War would be over.1 Of course this could not happen all at once. Nixon and 
his national security advisor, Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, thought they could phase out 
the Cold War by shifting relations with the Soviet Union from an atmosphere of confrontation to 
one of “restraint, coexistence, and, ultimately, cooperation.”2 They would end the Cold War by 
gradually easing tensions between the world’s two superpowers, a strategy that came to be 
known as détente.  
 Gaddis describes six key features of détente in his book Strategies of Containment, an 
exposition of the diverse ways U.S. administrations prosecuted the Cold War. First, it relied on 
negotiations between the U.S. and USSR as the principle venue of competition. Second, it 
required those negotiations to be connected by what was known as “linkage,” or the idea that the 
outcome of negotiations in one arena would impact negotiations in another. Third, the United 
States would normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Communist 
government in Beijing that was the Soviet Union’s main rival in the Communist world. Fourth, 
the United States would shrink its global military footprint. Fifth, the administration would 
balance its strategic withdrawals with tactical escalations, just as it did in Southeast Asia when it 
expanded its bombing campaigns against North Vietnam and Cambodia while withdrawing U.S. 
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ground troops. Finally, in order to be successful, Nixon needed complete centralized control over 
his foreign policy apparatus.3  
 Of these six principles, the two most significant changes on the world stage were the 
downsizing of the global U.S. military presence and the focus on negotiations. The trauma of the 
Vietnam War made downsizing the U.S. military a political necessity for Nixon. U.S. 
involvement on the Indochina peninsula had been escalating rapidly since the 1964 Gulf of 
Tonkin Incident, when North Vietnamese forces allegedly attacked two U.S. warships. In total, 
two and a half million U.S. soldiers fought in Vietnam, 58,000 lost their lives, and Washington 
spent $30 billion a year at the war’s peak. In 1968, when Richard Nixon ran for president, half a 
million U.S. troops were in Vietnam.4 Antiwar sentiment was turning U.S. politics to chaos, and 
Congress was finished pouring blood and treasure into Vietnam. Thus Nixon declared an 
overhaul in U.S. military strategy: the United States would honor all its existing treaty 
commitments and provide a nuclear shield for its allies and other strategic countries, but U.S. 
allies would have to take primary responsibility for their own defense. This was known as the 
Nixon Doctrine, and it was a central feature of détente because it guided how the administration 
would downsize the U.S. global military footprint.5 With a smaller military presence, the 
administration would compete with the Soviet Union primarily in the diplomatic arena through 
negotiations.6 
 Nixon planned on creating a global environment favorable for expanded negotiations and 
a retracted military by normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China. Because 
Beijing was Moscow’s main rival for leadership of the communist world, cooperative U.S.-PRC 
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relations would allow the administration to play the two Communist giants off each another and 
give the United States greater diplomatic leverage over the USSR. But better relations with 
Beijing would also make a war with Communist China less likely, and thus a global military 
withdrawal would be less risky.7 Effective implementation of détente thus hinged on normalizing 
relations with the PRC.  
 The problem was Nixon assumed that normalized relations with the PRC, a global U.S. 
military drawdown, and gradually reduced tensions with the USSR “did not mean a withdrawal 
from existing obligations” around the world.8 The first principle of the Nixon Doctrine was that 
the United States would honor all its treaty commitments. Maintaining all U.S. treaty 
commitments, however, conflicted with normalizing relations with the PRC, because the United 
States did not recognize the People’s Republic of China. Instead, it recognized and had a Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.  
 When the Communists declared victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, they did not 
depose the government they succeeded. The Nationalist government, which called itself the 
Republic of China (ROC), had fled the mainland and taken up residency on the island of Taiwan, 
where it established a provisional capital in Taipei and continued to claim legitimacy as the 
rightful Chinese government.9 In 1969 when Nixon took office, the United States still recognized 
the ROC. Beijing, however, was adamant that it exercised sovereignty over the island of Taiwan 
and that the ROC was illegitimate, having been defeated in the civil war. Nixon could not 
renounce the U.S. commitment to the ROC without reneging on his own affirmation of all U.S. 
treaty commitments, angering U.S. conservatives who were staunch ROC supporters, unsettling 
allies, and upsetting the world order by sacrificing a U.S. ally to appease a Communist power. At 
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the same time, sticking too closely to the ROC risked imperiling normalization with Beijing and 
the success of détente.  
 Thus, Nixon’s policy on the legitimacy of the ROC and the political status of the Taiwan 
island was the linchpin of his grand strategy. If his administration could walk the fine line 
between maintaining long-standing positions on the ROC and initiating a new era in U.S.-PRC 
relations, then Nixon could implement détente. Ideally, the United States would maintain its 
commitments to its allies, Beijing would agree to normalize relations with Washington, the 
administration would create a new global environment that would be favorable to negotiations 
with the USSR and a smaller U.S. military presence, and the United States would convince the 
USSR that preserving global stability was in its best interests. What the administration needed to 
figure out was what combination of policies constituted an adequate balance between the ROC 
and PRC.10 
 The existing scholarship on Nixon’s Taiwan policy does not recognize the importance of 
U.S.-ROC relations in the wider context of détente. For the most part, historians argue that 
Nixon and Kissinger threw away the ROC in their quest to open relations with the PRC. 
Historian and U.S.-China relations scholar Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues that “Nixon and 
Kissinger viewed Taiwan as expendable.”11 She argues that Nixon’s reassurances to Taipei were 
meant to appease political conservatives at home and were not a sign of the administration’s 
desire to maintain relations with the ROC; “Nixon and Kissinger rarely reflected on Taiwan at 
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all,” she claims.12 In fact, they reflected even less on domestic political reactions to their policies; 
the president and his administration simply tried to preserve ties with Taipei even as they 
established ties with Beijing. Another scholar argues “Nixon and Kissinger had to go through the 
motions of protecting Taipei’s interests…to guarantee the success of secret diplomacy.”13 Nixon 
and Kissinger believed secrecy was critical to connecting with Beijing, but their desire to 
maintain relations with the ROC was more fundamental than just using Taipei to shield secret 
diplomacy with Beijing.  
 Nixon and Kissinger would not have played fast and loose with a U.S. ally while they 
were trying to maintain U.S. credibility on the world stage.14 Claiming the administration saw 
the ROC as expendable is contrary to the record of their actions between Nixon’s inauguration in 
1969 and his historic visit to mainland China in 1972 and contrary to the maintenance of U.S. 
treaty commitments as a key tenet of détente. Understanding how the Nixon administration made 
Taiwan policy is a matter of understanding how they dealt with the internal contradiction in their 
détente strategy and how they implemented détente on the tactical level.  
 This thesis argues that Taiwan policymaking involved both process and product. 
Although Gaddis criticizes Nixon and Kissinger for cutting the State Department out of 
policymaking to the point that the White House’s lack of specific expertise when making policy 
became detrimental and made détente ineffective beyond relations with the USSR and PRC,15 the 
evidence in this thesis demonstrates that the State Department, and the Defense Department, 
played a significant role in Taiwan policymaking even though final decision-making authority 
was centralized in the White House. In terms of the product, Nixon and Kissinger consistently 
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sought to balance relations with Beijing and Taipei, and there is little evidence that their 
motivation for doing so was limited to domestic politics or the necessity of keeping their 
initiatives toward Beijing a secret. What that balancing act did allow them, however, was the 
opportunity to open relations with Beijing while not violating the Nixon Doctrine. The problem 
was that they did not know where the proper balancing point was, and during the first three years 
of the Nixon presidency, the White House, State Department, and Pentagon worked to find the 
proper balance.16  
 There were three pivotal moments in U.S.-ROC relations during the first Nixon 
administration. In 1969, the U.S. Navy ended its patrol of the Taiwan Strait, touching off a chain 
reaction that set the stage for the 1971-72 breakthrough to Beijing. In 1971, the United Nations 
General Assembly considered whether the ROC or PRC should represent China in the world 
body just as Nixon and Kissinger were starting to make progress with Beijing. Finally, in 1972, 
Nixon visited the mainland and tried to set the United States on a path to normalized relations 
with the People’s Republic of China. This thesis looks at how the Nixon administration made 
Taiwan policy in each instance by examining the intersection of process and product: what were 
the options, how did the administration weigh the pros and cons of each, and what policies 
resulted from that process?  
In this thesis, China refers to the country occupying a dominant position in Asian 
geography, bounded by the Soviet Union to the north, Pakistan to the west, India and Indochina 
to the south, and the Pacific Ocean to the east. In this period, with few exceptions, the country 
China was understood to include the island of Taiwan. Taiwan refers to the geographical entity: 
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the island lying off the coast of China, south of Japan. Taiwan will be used in contrast to the 
mainland, which refers to the portion of China on the Asian continent.  
Two different governments claimed to be the legitimate authority over China (i.e. the 
mainland and Taiwan). The Republic of China (ROC) was led by President Chiang Kai-shek, and 
exercised direct control over the island of Taiwan, where it had sought refuge at the end of the 
Chinese civil war in the late 1940s, and a few smaller islands. The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was led by Chairman Mao Zedong and his prime minister Zhou Enlai, and exercised 
direct control over the mainland portion of China. Those people who identified with the ROC 
will be referred to as Nationalists and those who identified with the PRC as Communists, since 
those are the political and governmental systems to which they ascribed.  
 China policy refers comprehensively to the U.S. government’s policies and general 
balancing act with the PRC and ROC: collectively, China. Taiwan policy refers to the 
administration’s policies towards the ROC and its island territory. Any other basic terms or 














Follow the Leader: The end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol 
 In the fall of 1969, the U.S. Navy stopped patrolling the Taiwan Strait. During President 
Nixon’s visit to Beijing more than two years later, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai raised the question of U.S. relations with the Republic of China (ROC). Of 
course Beijing wanted a peaceful reunion of Taiwan with the mainland, Zhou assured the U.S. 
president, but what if peaceful reunion was not possible? Of course Beijing would then be 
justified in invading Taiwan to expel Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government. Zhou reminded 
Nixon that he had already granted Beijing that right; the president had made that quite clear 
when the U.S. Navy stopped patrolling the Taiwan Strait.17  
The Taiwan Strait Patrol’s dual role as a symbol of U.S. tensions with the PRC and 
solidarity with the ROC makes its cancellation an ideal case for examining how the 
administration managed the impact of détente on the two Chinese governments. The Defense 
Department cancelled the patrol as part of its effort to implement the Nixon Doctrine. However, 
the actual decision to stop patrolling the Strait was only part of a larger story. The State 
Department went on to use the cancellation as a sign of goodwill toward Beijing, but at the same 
time it assured Taipei that the cancellation did not represent a change in U.S. policy toward the 
ROC. Thus the Taiwan Strait Patrol also had a dual role as a feature of the Nixon Doctrine and 
normalization with the PRC, and how the administration handled its cancellation says a great 
deal about how they handled the contradiction between the Nixon Doctrine’s affirmation of 
treaty commitments and the need to normalize relations with the PRC.  
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The progression of events surrounding the end of the patrol was not a thoughtful set of 
responses to a central problem. Instead, it was the result of accumulating decisions by the 
Defense Department, national security advisor, and State Department. Each actor took another’s 
decision and used it for his own purpose. Their goals, however, were guided by Nixon’s strategic 
vision of a smaller U.S. military footprint and normalized relations with Beijing. Thus the 
Defense Department, State Department, and the White House worked toward both goals at once, 
even though they were contradictory.  
The end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol only gets cursory treatment in most accounts of the 
Nixon administration’s China policy, whether in memoirs of the decision-makers who were 
involved or scholarly examinations of the Nixon foreign policy. Most American decision-makers 
and scholars mention the cancellation only in passing, but the leadership in Beijing obviously 
considered it a significant signal. The Taiwan Strait Patrol was situated at the intersection of 
implementing the Nixon Doctrine, opening relations with Beijing, and preserving relations with 
Taipei. Thus there were three questions facing the administration: how to implement the Nixon 
Doctrine, how to credibly signal a new relationship with Beijing, and what to do about the ROC 
as the administration moved closer to the PRC. Explicating the larger story of the cancellation of 
the Taiwan Strait Patrol helps us understand how the administration used the patrol to answer all 
three questions, and reveals how Taiwan policy was larger than just a means to appease Beijing 
and Congress.  
Though the withdrawal of the patrol was conveyed to Beijing in such a way that it 
implied the administration wanted to ease tensions with the PRC, that is not why the Navy 
actually canceled it. The decision flowed from Nixon’s call for a smaller U.S. military presence 




blood and treasure into Vietnam. The State Department assured Taipei the cancellation was not a 
change in U.S. policy, even as it implied to the PRC that the cancellation of the patrol was a 
change in U.S. policy. The U.S. embassy in Taipei told Chiang’s government that the change 
was merely part of the Navy’s larger global drawdown. The Pentagon, in fact, loaned ships and 
submarines to the ROC Navy so that it could continue policing the Taiwan Strait itself. The end 
of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was not a product of Nixon’s opening to China, but rather a military 
decision that the White House and State Department used in their efforts to ease tensions with 
Beijing.  
Perhaps the most intriguing thing about the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol, though, is 
that it challenges the traditional wisdom that Nixon and Kissinger wholly controlled the foreign 
policy apparatus. In this instance, the two lords of foreign policy took advantage of a policy 
change decided on and executed by the Department of Defense, rather than pulling strings 
behind the scenes to control the implementation of their grand design. The story of the end of the 
patrol involved a surprising degree of cooperation and interaction among the Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and national security advisor. In regards to China, implementing 
the details of détente was a decentralized process involving cabinet departments working 
independently of direct White House control while following the strategic guidance the president 
provided. From the beginning, at the highest levels of the administration, the goal of 
implementing détente in China was to strike a balance between relations with Beijing and with 







The History of the Taiwan Strait Patrol  
The island of Taiwan became part of the Chinese empire in 1885. Soon after, Japan 
seized the territory during the Sino-Japanese War and held it until the end of the Second World 
War. The Republic of China fought with the Allies in WWII, and several Allied agreements 
promised that Taiwan would be returned to China once Japan was defeated.18 
The Republic of China was founded in 1911 when the Chinese revolution overthrew the 
empire’s Qing Dynasty, but upon the death of the Republic’s first president, the country 
disintegrated into a period of internecine conflict. Sun Yatsen reunified the Republic of China in 
1921, and when he died in 1925 Chiang Kai-shek took power as president. Chiang launched a 
military campaign against the China’s Communists, but eventually allied with them to fight 
against Japan during the Second World War. In August 1945, the alliance between Chiang’s 
Nationalists and the Communists broke down and a full-scale civil war broke out.19 The course 
of the war turned against the government, and in January 1949 Chiang and his followers fled to 
Taiwan and established a provisional capital in Taipei.20 In October, communist leader Mao 
Zedong declared the People’s Republic of China with its capital in Beijing.21  
Only months later the United States went to war on the Korean Peninsula. Concerned that 
U.S. involvement on the northern end of East Asia might tempt the communist government in 
Beijing to launch an assault on the island of Taiwan, President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. 
Navy’s Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. While the ostensible purpose of the Seventh Fleet’s 
presence was to prevent the PRC from attacking Taiwan, scholars like Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 
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have argued that Truman also wanted to keep the ROC from attacking the mainland.22 Though 
Truman considered the interposition a temporary move necessitated by war, the U.S. Navy 
would continue to return to the Taiwan Strait for the next twenty years.  
 In 1954, Beijing launched an attack on two islands near the mainland coast that were 
controlled by the Nationalists after Chiang transferred 73,000 ROC soldiers to the islands, which 
he claimed were “crucial to the defense of Taiwan.”23 In response, the United States signed a 
Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC, committing itself to the defense of Taiwan. A year later 
Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, which authorized the U.S. president to defend the 
Nationalist-controlled offshore islands at his discretion. In 1959, when tensions again rose 
between the mainland and Taiwan, President Eisenhower sent the Seventh Fleet back into the 
strait to escort ROC ships carrying supplies to the offshore islands.24 Through the 1960s, the U.S. 
Navy would continue a regular patrol of the Taiwan Strait, keeping the PRC and ROC forces on 
their respective sides of this oceanic buffer zone.  
 In 1960, relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union cooled significantly. Beijing 
had long criticized Moscow’s “de-Stalinization” after the Soviet leader’s death, its 
accommodation of the United States, and perceived Soviet infringement upon PRC sovereignty. 
Gradually Beijing began loosening its ties with Moscow, moving away from both the Soviet 
Union and the United States and toward developing countries in Asia and Africa.25 
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By 1969, the Taiwan Strait Patrol consisted of two Navy destroyers stationed in the area 
and tasked with regularly cruising the waters between Taiwan and the mainland.26 Though the 
destroyers passed through the strait every day or two,27 the patrol had become more of a symbol 
than a precaution. Both Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, and the Vice Chief 
of the ROC General Staff admitted separately that the destroyers were of little military value.28 
Yet as Zhou’s remarks to Nixon suggest, this symbol played a major role in defining the tense 
relationship between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. Then in summer 1969, the Defense 
Department decided that it would no longer patrol the Taiwan Strait.29 In retrospect, the change 
seemed to be a signpost to Nixon’s opening to China in 1972.30 In reality, it was the symbol of 
something greater. The patrol’s cancellation was the result of détente on the tactical level: a 
series of decisions that came about because of the convergence of Nixon’s military and 
diplomatic strategies.  
 
The Decision to End the Patrol 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s biographer suggests that the cancellation of the 
Taiwan Strait Patrol was “[o]ne of Laird’s practical initiatives to further” the Nixon Doctrine.31 
The Nixon Doctrine, sometimes called the Guam Doctrine since Nixon first announced it in 
Guam, was the president’s strategic vision for the role of the U.S. military in Asia. It had three 
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parts: first, the United States would maintain its existing treaty commitments; second, the United 
States would continue to provide a nuclear umbrella for its allies; and third, the United States 
would expect its allies to take the primary responsibility for their own defense.32 Part of Nixon’s 
détente grand strategy was a trimming down of U.S. global military commitments. The Nixon 
Doctrine was a key piece in achieving that drawdown;33 and the cancellation of the Taiwan Strait 
Patrol was the manifestation of the Nixon Doctrine on the tactical level.  
The withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet’s destroyers from the Taiwan Strait was part of a 
larger program of Naval cutbacks during the same time period.34 All in all, the Navy would 
reduce its fleet from 976 ships in 1968 to 495 ships in 1974.35 However, after the U.S. Navy 
stopped patrolling the Taiwan Strait, the Pentagon loaned several submarines and ships to the 
ROC Navy, which began patrolling the strait itself.36 Thus, the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol 
was less an example of a withdrawal of U.S. military commitments than of a transfer of 
responsibility for Taiwan’s defense in line with the Nixon Doctrine. 
The Nixon Doctrine was also part of the larger politico-military environment in which the 
Pentagon operated at the end of the Vietnam War. As the war wound down, there was 
tremendous pressure coming from Congress to cut military spending.37 Laird accepted that 
Congress was going to enact military budget cuts, so the administration might as well trim 
military spending itself to ensure the cuts came in the best places.38 Thus budget-cutting was one 
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of Laird’s highest priorities as Defense Secretary.39 One tactic Laird used was cutting back on 
conventional forces (like Navy ships) in order to save new programs from the chopping block: 
programs like the B-1 bomber, the Trident nuclear submarine, and cruise missiles.40 It is possible 
that one motivation for ending the Taiwan Strait Patrol was to replace conventional forces, like 
Navy surface ships, with new high-tech weapons in deterring threats from the PRC. In 1971, 
Kissinger made several statements arguing that B-52 bombers and submarine-launched missiles 
could effectively deter any threat from Communist China on their own.41 
Finally, we cannot ignore the unique position of Secretary Laird when analyzing the 
decision to cancel the patrols. One reason the cancellation of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was a 
military decision and not a political one was the unique policymaking independence of the 
Pentagon thanks to its secretary. The first Congressman to become Secretary of Defense, Laird 
had been elected to nine terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, and had held prominent 
positions as the House Republican Conference chairman and a member of the House 
Appropriations Committee’s Defense Subcommittee.42 During the 1968 presidential election, he 
was a heavyweight advisor to the Nixon campaign: six of Nixon’s first term cabinet secretaries 
were suggested to him by Laird. Laird became Defense Secretary when Nixon’s first choice, 
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), declined the offer and a frustrated Nixon appointed 
Laird instead.43  
 Laird’s powerful position in the Nixon White House was somewhat of an accident. When 
Nixon threatened to name Laird Secretary of Defense since he failed to recruit Jackson, Laird did 
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not want the job. To get out from under Nixon’s furious berating, Laird accepted the post, but 
only under conditions he thought Nixon could never accept. Laird demanded full authority to 
appoint all his own subordinates, guaranteed in writing. Nixon accepted, wrote his guarantee on 
a napkin, and signed it.44 That miscalculation ended up making Laird an administration 
powerhouse. As Laird’s biographer writes, “the Pentagon was…a place apart, ruled solely by 
Laird.” He kept the napkin that was his contract with Nixon. When White House staffers tried to 
pressure Laird, he would invoke their agreement and even produce the napkin as proof if 
necessary.45 That promise, along with his long tenure in Congress and friends on the Hill, made 
Melvin Laird one of the most powerful men in the Nixon administration.46 In one instance, he 
unilaterally cancelled all U.S. military reconnaissance flights after North Korea shot down a U.S. 
spy plane. Laird kept the pilots grounded despite Kissinger’s fury over the decision and Nixon’s 
repeated orders to resume the flights.47 Laird is also known for decentralizing most policymaking 
within the Defense Department, especially in giving the services more control over “the 
development of budgets and force levels.”48  
Laird approved the Navy’s proposed slate of cutbacks, but he realized that the end of the 
Taiwan Strait Patrol had major implications for U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Therefore, as he told 
Kissinger,  
I advised the President…that some of the Navy’s proposed reductions, which I had 
approved, had certain political and military implications. The modification of the Taiwan 
Strait Patrol was discussed in some detail, including the possibility of a reaction by 
President Chiang.49  
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Kissinger recognized that President Chiang would not be the only Asian leader who would react 
to this change. He knew that the People’s Republic would be interested in the change as well, 
and he thought that was to the administration’s advantage.  
 
Signaling Beijing 
 In the late summer and early fall of 1969, Beijing and Moscow were tangled up in a 
renewed border dispute, which was making Henry Kissinger nervous. When Beijing announced a 
resumption of negotiations with the Soviets over the issue, Kissinger believed that the PRC had 
backed down and worried about the balance of power in the communist world. Hurrying to 
Nixon’s office, the national security advisor presented a plan to compile a list of possible actions 
the administration could use to preempt what he saw as an easing of tensions between the two 
communist giants. Nixon gave Kissinger the green light, and Kissinger went to find Elliot 
Richardson, the Assistant Secretary of State, to help him draft the list.50   
Richardson, the number two at the State Department, was an exception to the Nixon 
White House’s habit of cutting the State Department out of policymaking. A lawyer by training, 
he had been the Attorney General of Massachusetts, the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts, and 
previously served as the Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under 
Eisenhower. One of his first jobs in the Nixon administration was to help the designated national 
security advisor draft the reorganization of the National Security Council. From that point on, he 
later remembered, he served as the point man for Kissinger in the State Department. In an oral 
history interview with the State Department historian, he recalled that the two men “had lunch 
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once a week and met regularly in other connections. It was understood from the beginning 
that…I would attend all NSC meetings whether or not the Secretary was also there.”51 
 One of the actions Kissinger and Richardson suggested to the president was to leak word 
of the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol to the PRC. Their plan was to send a message to Beijing 
via Pakistani president Yahya Khan. Nixon approved the leak in mid-October 1969.52  
In late November the State Department suggested to Kissinger that the Hong Kong 
consulate also leak the change to PRC officials.53 The Hong Kong leak was the first step in 
prodding the Communists to resume the Warsaw Talks. The Hong Kong leak would validate a 
“formal pitch” of the end of the patrols in Warsaw, which would serve as the real carrot extended 
to the PRC ambassador.54  
NSC staffer John Holdridge wrote Kissinger that the plan to leak the end of the patrol 
was an attempt to make “political capital out of a decision taken on budgetary grounds,”55 which 
highlights that the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol involved a dispersed policymaking process. 
The Taiwan Strait Patrol policymaking process is best described as dispersed because it was 
characterized by departmental independence without a common goal uniting military and 
diplomatic policy; calling the process decentralized would imply the administration had a 
common goal and each department was given wide berth in working toward that goal. The 
Defense and State Departments were working toward different goals in fall 1969, however. 
Richardson and Kissinger were sending out feelers to Beijing, but the U.S. Navy was not 
thinking about easing relations with Beijing when it decided to recall its destroyers from the 
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Taiwan Strait. The decision to end the patrol was a budgetary matter, though it was guided by 
military strategy made in the White House. Using the change as diplomatic capital was the result 
of cooperation between the national security advisor and assistant secretary of state. The role the 
cancellation played in restarting the Warsaw talks is an example of one Cabinet department 
seizing on the policy change in another department and strategizing how to use it to the United 
States’ advantage in a new context. This image of independent and cooperating institutions is not 
a typical portrayal of the Nixon administration, but the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was the 
result of just such a process.  
 
The Balancing Act 
 Before the administration tried to convince the PRC that the end of the Taiwan Strait 
Patrol signaled a change in U.S. China policy, the State Department had reassured the ROC that 
the end of the patrol had no significance for U.S.-ROC relations. Washington instructed its 
embassy in Taipei to play up the budgetary concerns facing the U.S. Navy and point out that 
naval operations were being altered across the globe. The guidance also suggested reaffirming 
the U.S. defense commitment to the ROC in order to “allay [ROC] concern for its security 
interests as a result of this change.”56 The administration was telling Taipei that U.S. intentions 
to defend the ROC remained unchanged; unfortunately domestic factors outside the 
administration’s control forced them to pursue those intentions in a way that, at first glance, 
might make it seem as if the United States’ defense commitment was insincere.  
 In the diplomatic sphere, the cancellation of the Taiwan Strait Patrol symbolizes the 
inherent tension between signaling a new era in U.S.-PRC relations and maintaining existing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 “Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense 
Command,” September 23, 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972, 




treaty commitments toward the ROC. That tension was the key problem facing the Nixon 
administration as they moved to open relations with Beijing. In 1969, the State Department 
approached that problem by trying to balance its initiatives toward Beijing with its relations with 
Taipei. On the one hand, the Department hinted to Beijing that the change was a sign of things to 
come; on the other hand, the Department reassured Taipei that the change was simply one cut in 
a broader system of Naval cutbacks that had no specific significance for U.S.-ROC relations. In 
this instance, when faced with an internal contradiction in the détente strategy, the State 
Department and the White House tried to have it both ways: the U.S. would remake relations 
with the PRC while maintaining the status quo with the ROC.  
It is interesting to note that Richardson, the assistant secretary of state, signed the 
telegram issuing the guidance to the embassy in Taipei, and not someone at the East Asia desk. 
The reassurance came from the very top of the State Department hierarchy, and from a man who 
had a significant hand in using the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol to signal Beijing. The same 
people who were probing about for a new relationship with the PRC were reassuring Taipei that 
U.S. Taiwan policy was not changing. Thus, the balancing act between the PRC and ROC was 
not the result of bureaucratic inertia, of the ROC desk at the State Department managing 
relations with Taipei while other groups in the administration moved to open relations with 
Beijing. The same people who were working to signal a new era in U.S.-PRC relations were 
working to preserve U.S.-ROC relations.  
The other interesting point to note about Richardson’s signature on the guidance telegram 
is that it signifies that the State Department played a key role in managing this balancing act. 
Nixon and Kissinger were not the only ones involved in making U.S. China policy. Richardson’s 




Taiwan Strait Patrol could be used to restart the Warsaw Talks, and the Department’s 
simultaneous reassurances to Taipei that the cancellation was not a change in U.S.-ROC relations 
demonstrate that the State Department understood Nixon’s strategic goals and played a part in 
working with the White House to move toward those goals.  
 
Conclusion 
 In terms of the policy product, the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was less a move toward 
Beijing than it was the result of the convergence of three administration goals: paring down the 
U.S. global military footprint, signaling a new era of relations with the PRC, and preserving 
relations with the ROC. The Pentagon’s decision to end the patrol precipitated several actions on 
the part of the administration. The first was reassuring Taipei of the U.S. commitment to defend 
Taiwan, a reassurance which originated at the very top of the State Department. The second was 
loaning ships and submarines to the ROC Navy so it could maintain a regular patrol of the 
Taiwan Strait. The third was implying to the PRC that the end of the patrol represented a desire 
to ease tensions with the government in Beijing. Because the ROC and PRC governments were 
so closely connected in the international arena, the actions the Nixon administration took 
impacted U.S. relations with both. As we can see from the fact that the administration was telling 
the ROC the end of the patrol was not a change in overall China policy and telling the PRC the 
end of the patrol was a change in overall China policy, relations with Taipei and Beijing could be 
mutually exclusive. That tension, and Nixon’s desire to keep relations with both governments 
regardless, would characterize U.S.-ROC relations during the first Nixon administration.  
In terms of the policymaking process, the cancellation of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was the 




that characterized the early Nixon administration. The U.S. Navy decided in summer 1969 to 
recall the two destroyers, not under specific instruction from the White House or the Secretary of 
Defense but guided by the Nixon Doctrine, which called for a smaller U.S. global military 
footprint. The State Department decided to use the cancellation as diplomatic capital by 
conveying the information to Beijing as a sign of goodwill. The State Department leadership 
made sure to balance that initiative toward Beijing, however, by reassuring Taipei that the 
cancellation had no significance for U.S.-ROC relations. Thus, the end of the Taiwan Strait 
Patrol indicates that Taiwan policy in the early Nixon administration was driven not by the desire 
for normalization of relations with Beijing, but by Nixon’s broader grand strategy, of which the 
ROC and the PRC were two distinct but related pieces. The administration tried to maintain the 
status quo in relations with Taipei even as it made conciliatory gestures towards Beijing. 
 In the narrative of U.S. relations with Taipei, the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol’s most 
significant contribution is in illustrating how détente played out on the tactical level. Détente was 
not supposed to represent a major change in U.S. policy toward the ROC. In regards to the Nixon 
Doctrine, Washington’s call for allies to take on more responsibility for their own defense was 
somewhat mediated by the fact that the Pentagon provided the equipment for the ROC to do so. 
Thus the Defense Department retained a military connection to the ROC, even though it 
technically drew down the Navy’s commitments. In combination with Kissinger’s comments 
about B-52s and submarine-launched missiles deterring the PRC, the continued military 
connection indicates that the transfer of responsibility for the ROC’s defense did not mean a 
decline in Washington’s interest in the ROC’s defense.  
 On the diplomatic side, détente was intended to change U.S. relations with the PRC, but 




but not to Taipei. For the ROC, the end of the patrol was supposed to be less a matter of whether 
the U.S. was committed to the defense of Taiwan and more a matter of how it would defend the 
island. Washington instructed its ambassador in Taipei to tell the ROC government that the U.S. 
defense commitment remained unchanged; domestic budget constraints, however, forced the 
administration to draw down its military presence in the Taiwan Strait. Though that draw down 
might look ominous to the ROC, the U.S. ambassador was instructed to inform Taipei that it was 
not.  
 In Beijing two years later, Nixon would use that same logic to convince PRC prime 
minister Zhou Enlai that he was serious about normalizing relations with Beijing even though he 
would not cut off ties with Taipei. Nixon told Zhou that domestic politics made it impossible for 
him to distance himself from the ROC, but the president assured the prime minister that, between 
them, he was committed to closer ties with Beijing.57  
 The end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol also represents the intersection of the various 
personalities and institutions that came together to make foreign policy. The level of 
coordination among the Department of Defense, the White House, and the State Department is 
surprising when we expect to find Nixon and Kissinger dominating foreign policymaking with 
an iron grip. The end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was the product of different people with 
different motivations making decisions within their own jurisdictions, and of their relationships 
and interactions with one another. Thus, the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was not part of 
Nixon’s bigger plan for opening relations with Beijing. In fact, the U.S. Navy cancelled the 
patrol with Laird’s approval well before Kissinger and Richardson began signaling a change in 
U.S. policy toward Beijing. So while the cancellation of the Taiwan Strait Patrol is an episode in 
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the larger narrative of the opening to mainland China, it was not driven by Nixon’s desire to 
normalize relations with the PRC.  
 The story of what the State Department did with the decision to stop patrolling the 
Taiwan Strait also shows that the Nixon administration was not hell-bent on normalizing 
relations with the PRC at the expense of relations with the ROC. In fact, both the State and 
Defense Departments made efforts to balance their actions in regards to Taipei. When the State 
Department sent out feelers to Beijing, it also reassured Taipei of the United States’ continuing 
commitment to defend their island. When the Pentagon withdrew its destroyers from the strait, it 
also lent ships and submarines to the ROC Navy so the ROC could continue monitoring its 
neighbor.  
 The Nixon administration was not actively trying to disengage from the ROC nor was it 
de facto doing so through negligence. In fact, both the State Department and the Defense 
Department were taking deliberate steps to maintain the status quo in U.S. relations with Taipei. 
The end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol was not a major change in U.S. China policy, but the Nixon 
administration would continue trying to balance relations with Taipei and Beijing even when the 
needs of those two relationships were mutually exclusive. The first major test of the 
administration’s ability to keep this balance came at the United Nations on the evening of 










Re-Losing China: The 1971 United Nations Vote on Chinese Representation  
 U Thant was crying. From his place on the floor of the United Nations General 
Assembly, U.S. Ambassador George H.W. Bush thought he could see tears welling up in the UN 
Secretary General’s eyes as he watched what Bush later called the “gladiatorial ugliness” 
unfolding in the chamber. Entire delegations were dancing for joy in the aisles. Mounting the 
podium “to speak on a procedural motion,” Bush drew a cacophony of hisses from the permanent 
representatives of the world’s sovereign nations.58 The Republic of China’s Foreign Minister 
took to the podium. “In view of [the] frenzy and irrational behavior in this hall,” he said, “[the 
delegation] of China has decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this Assembly.”59 
With that he walked out. Bush watched helplessly as the delegation of the Republic of China 
walked through the chaos of the Assembly chamber and left the United Nations.  
 On the evening of October 25, 1971 Richard Nixon re-lost China when the UN General 
Assembly voted to take China’s UN seat from the Republic of China (ROC) and give it to the 
People’s Republic (PRC). The domestic political backlash was severe; Congress seriously 
considered reducing U.S. funds for the international body in retaliation.60 Yet U.S. outrage 
petered out rather quickly, and Nixon never faced the criticism that Harry Truman had weathered 
when he first lost China after the Communists defeated the Nationalists in their civil war, even 
though Nixon arguably did far more in 1971 to strengthen the Communists’ position in China 
than Truman ever did. Just months before, Nixon had announced that he would visit the People’s 
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Republic to discuss normalization of relations with Beijing; then in October the UN voted to seat 
Beijing in China’s seat, effectively recognizing the Communist government as the legitimate 
government of China. Why did Nixon move away from the ROC and toward the PRC with 
apparent impunity?  
 That question has not been sufficiently addressed because foreign policy scholars have 
paid so little attention to the 1971 UN vote to expel the ROC and seat the PRC instead. Even 
Richard Nixon devoted 39 pages of his memoirs to the 1971 efforts to ease relations with Beijing 
and only four paragraphs to the UN vote.61 Historians tend to skim over the event in the same 
cursory manner. Most scholars only refer to the vote as a signpost indicating the closing of 
serious relations with Taipei and the opening of a new relationship with Beijing. Too often, that 
cursory treatment oversimplifies the problem that Nixon faced in 1971.  
 The most common impression that the existing scholarship leaves is that Nixon and 
Kissinger were merely going “through the motions of protecting Taipei’s interests, if only to 
guarantee the success of secret diplomacy” with Beijing.62 This picture of an apathetic 
administration obligated by tradition or public opinion to pursue a course of action it found 
unnecessary is not accurate; Nixon and Kissinger were hardly going through the motions when 
defending Taipei’s UN seat.63 Instead, the 1971 Chinese representation vote was another 
example of the administration’s efforts to implement détente by balancing relations with Beijing 
and Taipei.  
That balancing act came to the forefront when the General Assembly considered whether 
the Republic or the People’s Republic was entitled to represent the UN member known as China. 
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The problem facing the administration was how its desire to have a relationship with both 
governments would work in the United Nations. One country could not be represented twice, but 
both the PRC and the ROC denied that they were the governments of two separate countries.64 In 
1971, the administration set out to craft a strategy for the October vote that would effectively 
solve the question of which Chinese government should sit in the UN. The United States and the 
ROC could not use their Security Council vetoes to decide the matter because this was a question 
about a country’s representation in the UN.65 China was already a UN member, and the General 
Assembly was voting on which government should occupy its seat, so the United States and the 
ROC needed to compile a coalition of nations that would vote to keep Taipei in the UN.  
The problem of Chinese representation was not new. In 1961, the United States and 
several cosponsors had proposed a resolution that made a change in Chinese UN representation 
an Important Question, a UN procedure that required a resolution to receive a two-thirds 
supermajority of the General Assembly to pass. In 1962, the Soviet Union sponsored a resolution 
that called for the China seat to be taken from Taipei and given to Beijing. That resolution failed 
to achieve the necessary support from two-thirds of the General Assembly. Similar resolutions 
sponsored by Albania in 1963 and 1969 were also met with Important Question resolutions and 
also failed to achieve two-thirds support.66 Ominously for the United States, each time a vote on 
Chinese representation was held fewer countries voted for the Important Question and more 
countries voted to admit Beijing. The Nixon administration faced its first Chinese representation 
vote in 1969, when the Albanian Resolution received a simple majority for the first time. The 
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day before the 1969 vote took place, Kissinger requested two policy studies: one on long-term 
policy toward Beijing and the other on policy toward the China seat in the UN.67 Around the 
same time, communication with Beijing began in earnest through backchannels with Pakistan 
and Romania.68 
 By January 1971, the State Department was convinced it could no longer garner enough 
support to pass an Important Question resolution. This meant the Albanian Resolution on the 
China seat would pass with the simple majority it had already received.69 All spring, the State 
Department scrambled to find the most viable strategies for saving Taipei’s place in the UN. 
Over the summer, Nixon weighed his options for the UN vote against the then-uncertain 
prospects for his overtures toward Beijing. Once Kissinger returned from Beijing in July and 
Beijing had agreed to a presidential visit, Nixon told the State Department to support PRC entry 
to the UN and introduce a resolution making Taipei’s expulsion an Important Question requiring 
a two-thirds super-majority. In September and October, Ambassador Bush, U.S. ambassadors 
around the world, and President Nixon all worked to build support to keep the ROC in the UN. 
On the evening of the vote, however, an unexpected wave of last-minute defections destroyed 
their efforts, and the ROC delegation walked out of the General Assembly for the last time.  
 The strategy the United States used to try to defend the ROC in the UN in 1971 was the 
result of a complex policymaking process inside the White House and the State Department, and 
of a complex balancing act between opening relations with the PRC and maintaining relations 
with Taipei. Just as the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol involved a surprising degree cooperation 
between the Departments of Defense and State and the White House, the State Department and 
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the White House worked together to build a winning strategy for the UN. The State Department 
essentially acted as the policymaking body in this instance, and the White House worked with 
the strategies that the State Department offered.  
This dynamic put the president in the position of the balancer. His détente grand strategy 
committed him to remake relations with the PRC and to preserve relations with the ROC. When 
the administration cancelled the Taiwan Strait Patrol in 1969, that balance had been manageable 
because maintaining it merely required sending different signals to Beijing and Taipei. In the 
UN, however, the administration could not just send different signals; it had to craft a coherent 
policy to sell to the international community.  
In 1971, Nixon was extending a hand toward Beijing in hopes of normalizing relations 
while simultaneously trying to keep Beijing from taking Taipei’s UN seat. Taipei’s 
representation in the UN was based on its claim to be the rightful government of China, whose 
seat it occupied. Normalizing relations with Beijing while saying Taipei was the legitimate 
government of China would be awkward; defending Taipei’s hold on the China seat while saying 
it was not the government of China would be ridiculous. Over the summer of 1971, Nixon 
struggled to find a strategy for the UN vote that allowed him to normalize relations with Beijing 
and keep Taipei in the UN. Thus, the preparations for the 1971 UN vote were fundamentally a 
matter of managing the internal contradiction in détente: that Nixon would open relations with 
the People’s Republic of China and preserve existing U.S. bilateral relationships, including the 







The Problem  
In January 1971 the consensus inside the State Department was that there were four ways 
to defend Taipei’s UN membership. First, the United States could continue to maintain its 
current strategy. Second, it could adopt the principle of “universality,” that all legitimate 
governments should be represented in the UN. Third, it could adopt universality and introduce a 
dual representation resolution that would seat both Beijing and Taipei. Finally, it could introduce 
a dual representation resolution alone.70 
Sticking with the existing strategy of declaring a change in Chinese representation an 
Important Question would be risky. The State Department predicted that within a year or two, 
the United States would no longer have the support to pass such a resolution. Maintaining the 
current strategy was an option, but it probably would not succeed.71  
Invoking universality would allow the United States to argue that both Beijing and Taipei 
should sit in the UN, but it would also have implications beyond just the Chinese representation 
question. According to the principle of universality, all legitimate governments should be 
represented in the UN; it was primarily directed at the so-called “divided countries” which had 
competing communist and non-communist governments. In the 1970s, China, Korea, Vietnam, 
and Germany were all divided countries. North Korea, North Vietnam, and East Germany were 
not UN members; if the administration used universality to call for Beijing’s entry to the UN, it 
might end up committing the United States to support these other communist governments’ entry 
at a later date. Only in the case of China and Germany, however, were both governments seeking 
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UN seats, and West Germany had indicated that it would be amenable to seeing East Germany 
seated in the organization.72  
Just adopting universality would be a passive defense against the section of the Albanian 
Resolution that would oust Taipei, but the administration could take the initiative and also adopt 
a dual representation resolution as an alternative to the Albanian option. Dual representation 
would allow both Beijing and Taipei to have seats in the UN. Such an arrangement would 
effectively split the China seat into two seats, which both Beijing and Taipei opposed. Both 
governments argued that there was only one China. They would not support any policy that 
appeared to imply that Taiwan was a separate political entity from the mainland, and thus that 
Beijing and Taipei were equally legitimate governments of two different countries. This was the 
so-called one-China or two-China problem. In this instance, however, the administration could 
avoid accusations of having a two-China policy by invoking universality—both Beijing and 
Taipei should be represented in the UN because they were both governments, not because they 
represented two different countries.73 
The State Department’s final option was to introduce dual representation without 
universality, but doing so would expose the administration to charges of having a two-China 
policy. Avoiding universality would avoid unnecessary implications for other divided 
governments, and dual representation might be more popular than the Albanian Resolution that 
would expel Taipei. Justifying dual representation without universality and without saying that 
Taiwan and the mainland were different countries would be difficult, however. Beijing and 
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Taipei could both attack dual representation as a de facto two-China policy.74 Each option the 
State Department presented had attractive advantages and forbidding disadvantages that the 
administration had to weigh.  
As the debates within the administration progressed, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green proposed a fifth option: the United States could 
introduce a dual representation resolution and another resolution declaring just the expulsion of 
Taipei an important question.75 Under this formula, voting Beijing into the UN would be 
relatively easy while voting Taipei out would be difficult.76 This plan assumed that what other 
countries really wanted was Beijing in the UN and not necessarily Taipei out of the UN. This is 
the option that Nixon finally approved.  
 Early on, however, the most popular option among staff at the State Department and the 
National Security Council was a dual representation resolution supported by universality, since it 
would seat Beijing while avoiding the need to explain why China should be allowed two UN 
seats. NSC staffer Marshall Wright argued that ROC membership was “in our interest,” and that 
dual representation was the best way to keep Taipei in the UN. He also believed that universality 
was the best justification because “it finesses the whole unanswerable question of one China, or 
two Chinas, or one China-two governments, etc.” Wright was cautious, however, and suggested 
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to Kissinger that the administration hold off on deciding whether to use universality until they 
were confident that other countries would support that logic.77  
 Assistant Secretary Green agreed with Wright that dual representation and universality 
was the best option, but he also thought the administration should make Taipei’s ouster an 
important question. At a National Security Council Senior Review Group meeting in March, 
Green and Wright sparred over the matter of the Important Question resolution. Wright thought 
it would “appear to be a gimmick.” The question of whether or not a new strategy would appear 
to be a “gimmick” was a recurring one in the early stages of the policymaking process. The logic 
was that there were two options for the 1971 vote: to present a proposal that would solve the 
Chinese representation issue once and for all, or to introduce a proposal that would only put the 
problem off. The consensus was that only an option the world community thought could 
reasonably solve the problem would earn enough votes to pass.78 
 Kissinger believed that the primary goal of any U.S. strategy should be to win. “I am 
pretty much persuaded that if the President decides to try dual representation, we should pick the 
formula that has the best chance of getting votes,” he told the Senior Review Group. “Otherwise, 
we will be opening the way for the Albanian Resolution.” And, as he had mentioned at the start 
of the meeting, “the President would react very badly if the end result of this exercise is the 
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Weighing Options  
 Before the National Security Council met on March 25, 1971 to discuss the 
administration’s strategy for the Chinese representation vote, Kissinger explained to Nixon that 
the UN vote would be a delicate balancing act with potentially serious consequences. The vote 
had implications for “U.S. international prestige, the attitude of the American public toward the 
UN, and our future relations with both Taipei and [Beijing].”80 In effect, the administration 
needed a policy that was acceptable to public opinion, Beijing, and Taipei. Should the United 
States lose the vote, U.S. prestige in the international arena could be seriously damaged. 
The State Department and Kissinger’s NSC staff revised the options based on which 
arguments would garner the most support and concluded that dual representation had the best 
chance of success. Ambassador Bush reported to the State Department that he did not believe 
universality would make a plan combining an Important Question resolution with a dual 
representation resolution more popular,81 and that making the Albanian Resolution an Important 
Question was no longer feasible. The only Important Question resolution that could garner 
majority support would be one that made “the expulsion of a member state” in general an 
Important Question.82 In Washington, Kissinger presented Nixon with three options. First, they 
could continue with the same approach, but the State Department was convinced the old 
Important Question resolution was doomed, and sticking with a losing strategy would raise 
questions about why the administration would want to lose. Second, the United States could 
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introduce a dual representation resolution by itself, or third, dual representation supported by 
universality. A dual representation resolution, he pointed out, could come in a variety of forms 
(“‘one China-one Taiwan’, ‘one China-two states’, ‘two China’s’, etc.”) but both the PRC and 
the ROC would reject any resolution that implied dividing China in two; any dual representation 
plan had to avoid any mention of either government’s claim to legitimacy.83  
 Yet Kissinger was still not sure about whether to use an Important Question resolution 
with dual representation. The advantage was that the Important Question required a two-thirds 
majority of the General Assembly to agree to any change in China’s UN representation. Without 
such a safeguard, “a simple majority can vote [Beijing] in and Taipei out,” which had already 
happened in 1969. The disadvantage, however, was that there was no indication two-thirds of 
UN members supported dual representation, so it would be imprudent to make a dual 
representation resolution an Important Question. Universality was extraneous, and thus Kissinger 
recommended avoiding it. There was no use in taking a stance that could impact relations with 
Germany, Korea, and Vietnam if it would not make a difference on the China question. 84 
 Then Kissinger introduced another complication: which government should sit on the UN 
Security Council if both governments sat in the General Assembly? The State Department 
thought the Security Council seat should go to the PRC. Kissinger thought that giving the seat to 
the PRC might be necessary, but “we can let that development be forced upon us rather than 
voluntarily taking a position which is anathema to our Taiwan ally.” Kissinger wrote Nixon that 
“State believes this should be treated strictly as a tactical issue and we should take no position 
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until we have consulted with our allies. My own view is that it goes to the heart of our relations 
with Taiwan….”85  
 Kissinger’s reluctance and the State Department’s willingness to give the Security 
Council seat to the PRC challenges the traditional narrative that Nixon and Kissinger wanted 
closer ties with Beijing and the State Department wanted to preserve ties with Taipei. Kissinger 
took the implications of the vote far more seriously than the State Department did, or at least he 
claimed to around Nixon. Historian and U.S.-China relations scholar Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 
argues that Nixon and Kissinger rushed to open relations with Beijing and left Taipei in the 
dust.86 But they were not rushing to Beijing if they did not want to sacrifice the ROC’s UN 
Security Council seat, and the State Department had to push them to do so.  
 When the National Security Council met on the morning of March 25, Secretary of State 
William Rogers and President Nixon were concerned with whether to justify dual representation 
using universality. Rogers said it was certain the administration would lose a vote on the 
traditional Important Question resolution, but rationalizing a new policy would require political 
finesse. The administration could say it was responding to changing realities; or it could claim 
universality and accept the implications for other divided countries. Nixon argued that recent 
polls indicated the American people were adamantly against Beijing entering the UN. “If we 
change our policy, we will get glowing editorials from the New York Times, Time Magazine, etc. 
but we will get a hell of a kick from the people,” he said. The U.S. could not reasonably say, “we 
have seen the light, and Communist China ought to be in the UN.” The administration had to 
defend Taipei’s UN seat; the real question was whether to use universality as justification. Nixon 
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admitted that it would set a precedent for the other divided states, but he thought any challenges 
there would be manageable.87 
Vice President Spiro Agnew, however, thought that the best course of action would be to 
let Taipei be voted out of the UN. Which government sat in the China seat was not a serious 
strategic interest for the United States. Agnew thought the administration should stick with the 
old policy and intentionally lose to show stalwart support for Taipei and avoid legitimizing the 
caustic political rhetoric Beijing would undoubtedly bring to the UN. On that note Nixon closed 
the meeting, saying he would think more about it during the weekend.88  
 After the National Security Council meeting, Kissinger recommended to Nixon that the 
administration introduce a dual representation resolution supported by the principle of 
universality, and make the expulsion of Taipei an Important Question. He narrowed the 
reasonable policy options to two: keeping the Important Question resolution or adopting a new 
policy, which Kissinger described as “the Vice President’s preference,” and “State’s preference,” 
respectively. Kissinger believed that dual representation, universality, and Taiwan’s expulsion as 
an important question was the only strategy that seemed capable of solving the Chinese 
representation question and garnering enough international support to pass. The national security 
advisor recommended consulting with Taipei before making a final decision, since this issue was 
ultimately about the ROC. He recommended that Nixon send a personal emissary to Taiwan to 
consult with Chiang Kai-shek, hold off on any final decision until that emissary returned, and tell 
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the State Department to make no statements on the issue until the president reached a decision. 
Nixon approved all three options and dispatched Ambassador Bob Murphy to Taiwan.89  
 
Making the Final Call 
 By the time Murphy returned from Taipei in May, Nixon was considering allowing the 
ROC to be kicked out of the UN. Murphy reported that Chiang would support Beijing entering 
the UN as long as Taipei remained in the Security Council; Nixon told him that “would be 
impractical.” On the other hand, the president suggested, if the United States were to go down 
fighting for the ROC using the traditional Important Question strategy, responsibility for Taipei’s 
ouster would lie with the UN and the administration “might better be able to limit the damage to 
our relations with Taiwan.”90 
 Kissinger agreed that there was no way Taipei could stay on the Security Council, but he 
disagreed that allowing Taipei to be expelled would be a good option. The administration could 
not defend Taipei’s Security Council seat because it could not use its veto and there was not 
enough international support to win a vote. Kissinger thought the U.S. was left with two options: 
propose dual representation knowing that the PRC would get the Security Council seat, or stay 
the course and realize that the United States would lose. Kissinger believed Chiang would never 
relinquish his Security Council seat, but protecting it would make the administration look like it 
was not serious about bringing in the PRC. If the United States used the traditional Important 
Question again, Taipei would be expelled and the administration would face severe backlash, but 
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the administration would have stood by an ally and Beijing would not be surprised. Kissinger 
recommended that Nixon tell Chiang the PRC had to have the Security Council seat.91 
 Nixon was unsure of how to proceed, and the problem was U.S. public opinion. In a 
discussion with the president, Kissinger noted that omitting universality and saying “Communist 
China in by majority vote; Taiwan expelled only by a two-thirds vote” was a good option, 
because it avoided “a general principle.” Nixon wanted to know what the domestic reaction 
would be before making a final decision. If the United States went down fighting for Taipei, the 
administration would be praised for standing by an ally and criticized for losing the vote. If the 
United States allowed Beijing in, the administration might be praised if Taipei stayed and would 
be criticized for letting in Beijing.92 
 When Nixon met with Walter McConaughy, the U.S. ambassador to the ROC, he was 
again leaning toward allowing Taipei to be ousted. Nixon assured him that the U.S. supported the 
ROC in the UN, but said salvaging the Security Council seat was unlikely. McConaughy replied 
that the Security Council seat was the biggest problem. In his estimation, the administration 
could keep Taipei in the Security Council by not explicitly giving the seat to the PRC; should 
Taipei lose that seat, it would likely walk out of the UN altogether. Nixon interjected: “if I were 
in their position, and the UN…moves in that direction, I would just say the hell with the UN…. 
It’s a damn debating society. What good does it do?” McConaughy managed to convince the 
president that the UN was a very important symbol for the ROC. The ambassador pointed out 
that Taipei saw a particular “psychological importance” to the UN. “They don’t want to be 
isolated,” he argued, and they worried that other countries would cut bilateral ties with them if 
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they were not a UN member. Nixon became less belligerent, and by the end of the meeting he 
was nearly convinced by McConaughy’s argument.93  
 By early July, the State Department was pessimistic about the United States’ chances for 
winning the vote. In the early spring, the department had predicted that a dual representation 
resolution would pass easily if the administration began lobbying then, cosponsored the 
resolution, and gave the PRC the Security Council seat. “In part due to our delay,” Rogers wrote 
Nixon, “the situation has changed over time.” A “bandwagon psychology” had set in as Beijing 
opened “relations with seven countries in the last six months.” The U.S.’s overtures to the PRC 
over the same time period, Rogers argued, had also “led many countries to assume that we are 
emphasizing our bilateral relations with the PRC and deemphasizing” the importance of the UN 
vote. If the U.S. were to cosponsor a dual representation resolution and begin building support 
for it immediately, Rogers thought they might win by five to seven votes. If the U.S. did not 
cosponsor the resolution and the Security Council seat stayed with Taipei, the resolution would 
fail by as wide a margin as twenty votes. Of course, all estimates were only tentative, Rogers 
impressed upon the president.94  
One of the most criticized aspects of the UN vote is Nixon’s delay in making a decision. 
At the NSC meeting in March, the State Department had requested a decision within 2 weeks. 
Rogers had been pressing Nixon for a decision, but the president was obviously stalling. The 
delay was not worrying only the State Department. NSC staffer Marshall Wright wrote Kissinger 
that he was concerned that the administration was “literally going to lose this by default.” He 
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asked the national security advisor if he should draft a decision memo for Nixon or if he ought to 
relax. Kissinger told him to relax.95  
The cursory treatment most scholars give the UN vote leaves the wrong impression about 
Nixon’s intentions behind the delay. Many historians argue the president intentionally abandoned 
Taipei to ingratiate himself with Beijing.96 In fact he was thinking hard about how to balance 
defending Taipei’s UN seat against rapidly accelerating progress with Beijing.  
Nixon had been gesturing towards a change in U.S. China policy since his inaugural 
address in January 1969.97 In the fall of 1969, the State Department had leaked the end of the 
Taiwan Strait Patrol to Beijing as a signal of the administration’s desire to ease tensions with the 
PRC. In the spring of 1970 the State Department took further steps to relax tensions, moving to 
normalize trade and travel between the United States and PRC. The president feared for the 
future of his initiatives in May 1970 when Beijing called off the backchannel Warsaw talks after 
the U.S. bombings in Cambodia, but later that year Washington and Beijing set up new 
backchannels through the presidents of Pakistan and Romania.98  
One of the most famous breakthroughs in Nixon’s China policy came when Beijing 
invited a U.S. Ping-Pong team to compete in the PRC. A more serious breakthrough came when 
PRC prime minister Zhou Enlai sent word to Nixon via the Pakistani president that the PRC 
would welcome “a special envoy of the President” to discuss further normalization. That 
message prompted Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and the PRC’s historic 
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invitation to Nixon to visit the mainland.99 Thus the decision about how to defend Taipei’s UN 
membership and the breakthrough in negotiations with Beijing overlapped. In the spring and 
early summer of 1971, Nixon was trying to convince Beijing to take the first step towards normal 
relations while trying not to offend them by sticking too closely to Taipei in the UN. 
Nixon was caught between his desire to save Taipei’s UN seat and the need to act gently 
around the PRC lest they suddenly reject Nixon’s overtures. The president was not delaying, per 
se; he was cautiously weighing his options. He needed to see if Beijing would agree to a high-
level emissary visit. For that, he needed to play down U.S. efforts to fight for Taipei in the UN. 
In the interval, though, Nixon was thinking hard about how to best maintain bilateral U.S.-ROC 
relations. He considered going down fighting over the traditional Important Question resolution 
to signal the strength of his administration’s commitment to the ROC. Ambassador McConaughy 
finally convinced Nixon against that course of action. Keeping the ROC in the UN was an 
important symbol. After his conversation with McConaughy, Nixon no longer discussed 
allowing Taipei to be ousted.  
 
Emphasize Political, Not Legal, Arguments 
 Once Kissinger returned from Beijing and Nixon announced an upcoming presidential 
visit to the PRC, Nixon dove back into the efforts to save Taipei’s UN seat. At the end of July he 
met with Rogers and Kissinger to give his final decision on U.S. policy. Rogers told Nixon that 
the State Department could stick with its current policy and go down fighting in the UN. Nixon 
said no. It would not look good, Nixon thought, to announce a presidential visit to Beijing and 
then turn around and vote against their entry to the UN. Rogers and Kissinger both agreed. The 
United States should do all it could to defend Taipei’s seat. Kissinger pointed out that it might be 
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best to fight not on legal, but political grounds. Nixon concurred: “what we really need here…is 
to have George [Bush]…not to make a great big damn legal case for it, just say the nation 
shouldn’t be expelled, and we’re going to fight for them.”100   
Interestingly enough, the administration’s strategy for defending Taipei’s seat rested on 
the same principle as détente: “the realism to accept the world as it was, [and] the ingenuity to 
make the best of it.”101 The dual representation and important question resolutions Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Martin Herz had drafted were 
clearly intended to defend the ROC’s seat without referencing legal arguments; in fact, he wrote 
Rogers that a primary requirement of any resolution was that it should avoid any legal 
arguments, since those would only provide “targets for rebuttal.” Dual representation was based 
on “de facto reality” and not on legal principles, thus geopolitical reality and not international 
law should be the theoretical foundation for the resolution.102  
The State Department’s instructions to all its embassies on how to build support for the 
ROC’s UN membership used the same geopolitical arguments that Herz delineated. Washington 
argued that “dual representation is the only fair solution,” since neither the PRC nor the ROC 
actually represented all Chinese. Further, “both the PRC and the ROC exist. The UN should take 
cognizance of realities.” The Department emphasized that it was not the UN’s place to decide 
which government was the true Chinese government, nor should the vote determine whether 
countries maintained bilateral relations with the PRC or ROC. Finally, the State Department 
argued that expelling the ROC would be a bad precedent and likely be permanent, since it would 
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have to reenter the UN as a new member, which the PRC could veto from its place on the 
Security Council.103 
In early September, Kissinger told Nixon that Rogers wanted to give the Security Council 
seat to the PRC. Kissinger said the State Department had tried to keep the Security Council seat 
out of the picture, but “there is not a prayer of maintaining [Taipei’s] membership in the United 
Nations unless our dual representation resolution provides the Security Council seat to 
[Beijing].” Kissinger thought three factors determined what to do about the Security Council 
seat: domestic politics, international politics, and the upcoming presidential visit to Beijing. In 
the domestic arena, Kissinger assessed that conservatives would be angry at installing the PRC 
on the Security Council, but they would be angrier still if Taipei were voted out entirely. In the 
international arena, defending Taipei was becoming a matter of principle. Kissinger pointed out 
that their stated policy was to defend the ROC, and now they had to defend it.  
Because the administration had broken through to Beijing and received an invitation for a 
presidential visit, Kissinger believed that they could be more explicit in their defense of Taipei. 
In June and July, Nixon worried that their actions in the UN might derail his opening with the 
PRC, but now his national security advisor did not believe the United States’ actions in the UN 
would have any impact on Beijing. He believed the PRC knew its eventual entry into the UN was 
now inevitable, and thus would not “attach cardinal importance to what we do” to defend Taipei. 
Kissinger recommended giving the PRC the Security Council seat. He thought there might be 
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negative repercussions domestically for installing the PRC on the Security Council but those 
might be outweighed by keeping Taipei in the General Assembly as a result.104 
Nixon also personally contributed to the efforts to save Taipei’s seat. Kissinger’s deputy 
Alexander Haig sent Nixon a memo indicating a few instances where Nixon’s intervention might 
help build support for the efforts in the UN. The memo is remarkable less for its contents than 
for the annotations Nixon made in the margins. Nixon appears more forceful than Haig in 
working for success in the UN. Haig noted that the administration needed to do more to pressure 
Botswana, noting that this “is a country for which we have done much recently.” Nixon wrote in 
the margin, “No more aid.” The Ghanaian president had requested a visit with Nixon on his 
upcoming trip to the United States. Haig suggested Nixon grant the Ghanaian president a visit 
and use it as an opportunity to pressure him for support. Instead, Nixon wrote “No, unless a 
vote,” instead using a presidential visit as a bargaining chip. Malta was sending a new 
ambassador to Washington, and Nixon was scheduled to meet him. Haig requested that Nixon 
ask for support on the Important Question resolution. “Done,” Nixon wrote.105 These notes do 
not reveal a president who was apathetic toward whether or not the ROC remained in the UN.  
Rogers alerted Nixon on October 12 that the United States was struggling to build a 
majority for both resolutions but that he was cautiously optimistic a victory was still possible. 
The administration might be able to get just over one-third of the General Assembly to vote 
against the Albanian Resolution. Thus if the Important Question resolution passed and the 
Albanian Resolution was defeated, they might be able to convince just enough supporters of the 
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Albanian Resolution to vote for the dual representation plan that they could win the vote. Rogers 
concluded that “everything thus depends on picking up the necessary number for the Important 
Question, thus requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption of the Albanian Resolution.”106  
There was one final conflict in U.S. policy that Nixon needed to resolve: how the vote 
and Kissinger’s second trip to Beijing would impact each other. Rogers and Ambassador Bush 
worried that if Kissinger arrived in Washington immediately before the vote it would 
demonstrably impact the outcome. Haig disagreed, but Nixon overruled him. He instructed Haig 
to tell Kissinger to land in Hawaii or Alaska and wait to fly back to D.C. until the vote 
concluded.107 Historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues that the dates for Kissinger’s second trip 
to Beijing were determined after the date of the UN vote was set, so the White House knew 
about the conflict from the start. Kissinger, she writes, argued that his visit to Beijing needed to 
happen before the vote so if the ROC was voted out it would not affect the trip.108 Nixon and 
Kissinger wanted to balance relations with both Chinese governments. That balancing act 
worked both ways: relations with Taipei needed to be curtailed somewhat to allow room for 
normalization with Beijing.   
Going into the vote, Bush and his staff were not optimistic. On October 22, they alerted 
the State Department that they did not believe the Important Question would pass. They 
suggested two possible contingency plans: 1) support a set of Saudi amendments to the Albanian 
Resolution which would fundamentally revise it, or 2) work towards deleting the provision of the 
Albanian Resolution that would expel Taipei. The message concurred with the State 
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Department’s assessment that there was likely no hope for the United States’ dual representation 
resolution.109 Two days later, in a meeting with the Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese 
embassies, U.S. delegation officials announced that Washington “felt at the highest levels [that] 
our position was strong and we should press on with” the Important Question. There would be no 
contingency planning.110  
 
Conclusion 
On October 26, 1971, the State Department received a telegram from its UN embassy. 
“Unexpected defeat of [Important Question] by vote of 55-59-15 Oct 25 caused by massive last 
minute Arab defections…. Loss of IQ by four votes evening Oct 25 came as surprise when 
compared with conservative voting estimate of 60-57-13 early same morning.” First, the 
Belgians had changed their vote from a yes to abstention. Then, Trinidad and Tobago changed 
from abstain to no. The session had not even begun yet. Once it did, things only got worse. 
Lebanon informed the U.S. delegation that Cyprus was thinking about changing its vote. A 
discussion with the Cypriots revealed the tip was true; they would no longer be supporting the 
Important Question resolution. Morocco then changed its vote from yes to abstain. Tunisia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman had all promised to support the United States. Tunisia inexplicably 
introduced several alternate resolutions and then abstained from voting on the Important 
Question. Oman’s representative disappeared, only to be found in his hotel room saying he 
received instructions to leave the chamber and not vote. Qatar’s representative informed the 
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United States that he had also been instructed not to vote, but preferred to abstain instead. Only 
Mexico changed its position to vote with the United States.111  
The Important Question resolution had failed. Delegations began dancing for joy in the 
aisles. Bush was hissed as he tried to speak from the podium. Tears welled in U Thant’s eyes. 
The ROC foreign minister made one last statement from the floor of the General Assembly, and 
the ROC left the United Nations.  
This was what Kissinger returned to when he finally returned from his visit to Beijing. 
George H.W. Bush recalled that in his first conversation with Kissinger after the vote, the 
national security advisor was furious.112 Congress would be livid.113 By the time Kissinger 
returned, some Congressmen had already made statements about cutting funding for the UN.114 
Yet, though the ROC no longer sat in the UN and the public outcry was dramatic, on a 
substantive level Taipei’s ouster was not a major disaster for the Nixon administration. Many 
Congressmen were against cutting funding to the UN over this vote.115 William F. Buckley Jr., 
the influential conservative commentator, blamed the UN for the ROC’s expulsion more than he 
blamed Nixon.116  
So the ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations was not a complete disaster for the 
Nixon administration even as it was definitely a political setback. The vote’s decidedly mixed 
results were the product of a nearly year-long, dispersed policymaking process in which the 
administration tried to occupy the middle ground between the conflicting needs of opening 
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relations with Beijing and maintaining the status quo with Taipei. In terms of the policymaking 
process, the vote was the culmination of months of strategizing and consulting with allies by the 
State Department as they tried to present the White House with the best possible options for the 
vote in October, and of months of weighing and considering by Nixon and Kissinger about 
which options fit best with their as yet uncertain initiatives toward Beijing. In terms of the policy 
product, the summer of 1971 was an uncertain time for U.S.-PRC relations and Nixon did not 
want to wreck his chances with Beijing, because normalized relations with the PRC were critical 
to his goal of containing the Soviet Union diplomatically instead of militarily. At the same time, 
he did not want his overtures to Beijing to result in ousting the ROC from the UN, because that 
would violate his commitment to maintain all existing treaty commitments. In the end the ROC 
was ousted, so did Nixon fail? He certainly did not get what he wanted.  
Some historians, however, have implied that there was nothing the administration could 
have done to save Taipei’s seat.117 If all roads led to Taipei’s ouster, what did Nixon get out of 
picking the path he did? He was trying to balance relations with both Beijing and Taipei, and a 
dual representation resolution combined with making the ROC’s ouster an important question 
seemed the best way to do so. Washington would support Beijing’s entry to the UN and defend 
Taipei’s membership, and would justify that position using the détente principle of geopolitical 
reality. In that sense, the administration’s strategy in the UN was an example of implementing 
détente on the tactical level: they used an acceptance of geopolitical realities to justify balancing 
a new era of relations with the PRC with a continued commitment to the ROC. During the 1971 
UN vote on Chinese representation, international political developments made that balance 
difficult to maintain. Nixon’s next challenge would be even more difficult in some respects. In 
Shanghai on February 28, 1972, the president would announce his Taiwan policy to the world.  
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A Policy Everyone Can Agree On: The Alternative History of the Shanghai Communiqué   
 On the final day of President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to mainland China in 
February 1972, the administration and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) issued what came 
to be known as the Shanghai Communiqué. This press release used an unconventional dialectic 
format where the United States and the PRC stated their strategic worldviews, their positions on 
matters of mutual interest such as the conflict in Korea, the Vietnam War, tensions between India 
and Pakistan, and the political status of the Taiwan island, and then jointly stated what goals and 
principles they held in common. The two countries’ positions on Taiwan received their own 
sections. The infamous U.S. statement told the world that 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, 
it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military 
installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and 
military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.118  
 
At first glance, these sentences seemed to reverse nearly thirty years of U.S. foreign policy. It 
appeared the Nixon administration had downgraded Taiwan’s status from home of “the sole 
legitimate government of all China”119 to merely “a part of China.”120 The real meaning of that 
passage, however, was far more complicated.  
Richard Nixon visited the PRC from February 22 to 28, 1972 and held substantive but 
noncommittal talks with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Communist Party Chairman Mao 
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Zedong. The Shanghai Communiqué was the first report most of the world saw of the content of 
these talks. The two governments would not sign a treaty or other official agreement at the end of 
the visit; they would only release this statement. Thus, it was important from a political 
perspective that the wording walk the fine line between maintaining long-standing positions and 
indicating a new era in U.S.-PRC relations. 
Taiwan policy was the linchpin of Nixon’s grand strategy. Normalizing relations with 
Beijing was critical to implementing détente, and normalization with Beijing required 
articulating a policy on the island and the ROC that was acceptable to Beijing and that 
maintained U.S. relations with the ROC. When Nixon went to Beijing in February 1972 to talk 
with Mao and Zhou and officially start the normalization process, he was going to articulate that 
policy; the Shanghai Communiqué was going to summarize what he told Mao and Zhou. So the 
problem for the administration as they prepared for the presidential visit and during the visit 
itself, especially when it came to drafting the Taiwan section of the Shanghai Communiqué, was 
in working out how they wanted to portray the new relationship with Beijing in relation to long-
standing U.S. policies and international commitments.  
What stands out about the Shanghai Communiqué in the larger context of Nixon’s 
Taiwan policy is that it did not involve the dispersed policymaking process that characterized the 
end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol and the preparations for the 1971 UN vote. The president and his 
national security advisor were really the only two people wrestling during the winter of 1971-72 
with how to portray U.S.-ROC relations in the midst of normalization with the PRC. Thus, 
understanding the meaning of the Taiwan section of the Shanghai Communiqué allows us to 
isolate Nixon’s conception of détente and how it would work on the tactical level. However, 




the Shanghai Communiqué, so the existing scholarship does not fully explicate the complex 
meaning of the Taiwan section. The negotiations that settled the final wording involved 
contentious debate as Nixon and Kissinger tried to work out the details of détente with 
Communist China.  
 The story of the Shanghai Communiqué began in July 1971, when Henry Kissinger made 
his famous secret trip to Beijing to commence the first high-level talks between the United States 
and the People’s Republic of China. During that visit, he and Prime Minister Zhou agreed that 
Nixon should make an official presidential visit to the country to discuss normalizing relations. 
This would be the first time a sitting U.S. president had visited China. In October 1971, as the 
State Department was in the final frantic days of gathering support for Taipei’s representation in 
the UN, Kissinger returned to Beijing. This time, his mission was to discuss the logistics of the 
presidential visit.  
 Part of Kissinger’s assignment was to negotiate the wording of the press release the two 
governments would issue at the end of Nixon’s trip. Initially, the White House draft was 
formulaic, but Beijing wanted something a bit more substantive. By the end of Kissinger’s visit, 
he and Zhou remained hung up on the specific wording, especially in the section on Taiwan. So 
they put their negotiations on hold and agreed to finalize the wording when Kissinger returned 
with Nixon in February 1972.121  
 Over the course of the next few months, the White House and State Department worked 
to prepare policy positions for the talks between Nixon and the PRC leadership. Kissinger and 
the president also discussed strategy and the details of the Shanghai Communiqué. The two men 
decided to take a conciliatory approach while in Beijing in order to give the impression that 
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Nixon understood the needs and interests of the PRC. They also divided the dispute with Beijing 
over the legal status of Taiwan into five key principles that they could agree on with the PRC 
while maintaining relations with the Republic of China (ROC), though Nixon worried that the 
Shanghai Communiqué would give U.S. conservatives the impression that he was turning his 
back on the Nationalists.   
 Over the course of the presidential visit, Kissinger and PRC Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua also worked to finalize the Communiqué.122 Secretary of State William 
Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green 
received a copy of the final draft the night before it was to be released. They took issue with the 
fact that the Communiqué did not refer to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and 
the ROC. They managed to force an angry Henry Kissinger back to the negotiating table over the 
matter. On February 28, the last day of the trip, Kissinger and Green held a press conference to 
issue the statement, and officially ushered in a new era in U.S.-PRC relations.    
 The Shanghai Communiqué was not so much a turning point in U.S.-ROC relations as it 
was a continuation of the policy that had emerged in 1969 with the cancellation of the Taiwan 
Strait Patrol and continued in 1971 as the State Department fought for Taipei’s right to 
representation in the United Nations General Assembly. Nixon did not want to walk away from 
the Nationalists as he leaned toward the Communists; he wanted to maintain relations with the 
former even as he normalized relations with the latter. In 1969 the administration had balanced 
the signals the administration was sending to Taipei and Beijing. In 1971 they had crafted a 
policy that justified why the two governments should both be represented in the UN. With the 
Shanghai Communiqué, Nixon tried to maintain that balance when he had to articulate a policy 
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on U.S. relations with the ROC in the context of a new relationship with the PRC. The President 
sought to craft a policy everyone could agree on: one that would be acceptable to the ROC, the 
PRC, and the U.S. public. The administration had been working toward such a policy since 
September 1969, but in February 1972 the time came to put that policy down on paper. 
 
The Nixon Way 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of great political upheaval in the United 
States. The traditional political alignments were breaking down, and Richard Nixon wanted to 
take advantage of that shift. His goal was to build a broad voting coalition around the Republican 
Party but founded on an acceptance of existing New Deal institutions and a desire to work with 
those institutions to implement Republican policies. The New York Times characterized Nixon’s 
domestic policy as “a ‘baffling blend of Republicanism and radicalism.’”123  
 British historian Robert Mason argues that this sought-after new voting coalition had not 
coalesced by Nixon’s 1968 election campaign, however. Instead, Nixon spent his first term 
building the coalition through policies meant to unite the spectrum of voters generally located 
between the center-left and the right. He particularly focused on what was then called “middle 
America,” or the “aggregate which at its widest included all those whites who were neither 
affluent nor poor: its center appeared to lie somewhere between the upper ranks of blue-collar 
workers and the lower ranks of white-collar workers and the self-employed.” Nixon claimed that 
his strategy for building a new Republican majority based on middle America was summed up 
by a campaign sign he saw in Ohio: “Bring us together.”124 The Nixon administration would 
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create a new Republican coalition by introducing policies that voters from the center-left to the 
far right could all agree on.  
 On the right end of Nixon’s target spectrum was Bill Buckley. A political commentator 
with a colorful background, William F. Buckley Jr. grew up fluent in Spanish, French, and 
English. He matriculated at Yale where he was recruited by the CIA, and spent the late 1940s 
and early 1950s “pretending to work in an export-import business while infiltrating the student 
political movement in Mexico City,”125 before founding the conservative political magazine 
National Review. The story of his relationship with Richard Nixon was equally discombobulated.  
 National Review was supportive of Vice President Nixon in the 1950s, even as it was 
only moderately supportive of Eisenhower. The publication was less favorable toward President 
Nixon, however. Its writers were uneasy with Nixon’s domestic policies, which they believed 
left the federal government too much of a role, and by his “political strategy,” which one 
commentator called “a simultaneous envelopment from both the right and left flanks…[that] 
makes it difficult at times to figure out just what’s what….” Buckley’s personal relationship with 
the president was similar to National Review’s. When John Ashbrook, Republican Congressman 
from Ohio, challenged the president in the 1971 Republican primaries, Buckley and his 
publication endorsed the more conservative Ashbrook. When Nixon won the party’s nomination, 
Buckley switched his allegiance back to the president, but only because “the potential 
consequences of electing [the Democratic nominee] McGovern appeared worse” than the 
consequences of another Nixon term. Buckley was vocally displeased with Nixon’s initiatives 
toward the PRC, although he was included among the press that attended the historic China 
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trip.126 When Nixon and Kissinger strategized the wording of the Shanghai Communiqué, 
Buckley’s reaction was a key concern of the president’s.127 
 On the other end of Nixon’s coalition was Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Raised in a 
devout Lutheran family of Norwegian immigrants, Jackson was trained as a lawyer before being 
elected to the House of Representatives. Though he was originally an isolationist, his views on 
foreign policy changed as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He became a proponent of the 
militarist foreign policy strategy epitomized by NSC 68, the Truman administration foreign 
policy document that conceptualized the Cold War as a “long-term” military struggle between 
the United States and Soviet Union. Jackson opposed Eisenhower’s cost-saving approach to the 
U.S. military, believing “that the United States not only should, but could, spend significantly 
more on defense.”128 
 Thus, Senator Jackson’s stance on the military was diametrically opposed to President 
Nixon’s détente strategy of reduced U.S. military commitments. Jackson was a prominent 
opponent of easing tensions with the U.S.S.R. On China, however, he and the president were 
much more kindred spirits. Jackson’s biographer says that “he admired, and at times 
romanticized, the Chinese…for their emphasis on hard work, strong families, and education, the 
very qualities he admired most about his own Norwegian background.” Thus, he was a 
wholehearted supporter of Nixon’s initiatives toward Beijing.129  
 Nixon’s domestic political strategy was to bridge the gap between the Buckleys and the 
Jacksons (as much as possible) by introducing policies on which they could both agree (or at 
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least support grudgingly). This strategy was executed in the context of a large-scale political 
realignment in U.S. politics. Nixon believed he could take advantage of that realignment by 
uniting the Buckleys and Jacksons of U.S. politics into a coalition that accepted and worked 
within New Deal era institutions to implement Republican policies.  
In many ways, Nixon used that same strategy in dealing with the two Chinese 
governments. The steady ebb of support for the U.S. position on Chinese representation in the 
UN could be taken as a sign of an international political realignment.130 Nixon’s China policy 
was an effort to take advantage of that political realignment by accepting the existence of 
Communist China (much like he accepted the existence of the New Deal institutions), and 
working with it to implement U.S. policy. The Shanghai Communiqué was Nixon’s main effort 
to build support for his China policy by limiting that policy to those positions on which the 
Buckleys and Jacksons of his coalition could both agree (or at least support grudgingly). 
 
Manufacturing Agreement with Beijing 
The White House broke down the U.S.-PRC disagreement over Taiwan into five basic 
points, known as the five principles. First was the longstanding debate over a one-China policy 
or a two-China policy that had plagued the State Department in its efforts to keep the ROC in the 
UN. Second was the future of U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan. Third was whether the United 
States supported the ROC’s desire to launch an assault to regain control of mainland China. 
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Fourth was whether the United States would acquiesce to Japanese designs on Taiwan. Fifth was 
the emergence of Taiwanese independence movements.131  
Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the United States and the PRC technically agreed on 
each of these points.132 The United States had long denied that it had a “two-China policy.”133 
Most U.S. troops on Taiwan were there to support the Vietnam War or other operations in the 
Pacific, so an end to the Vietnam conflict would reduce the number of troops on the island and 
others could be transferred to other bases in the Pacific.134 The United States had never supported 
Chiang’s desire to revive the civil war.135 There is no evidence that Washington wanted Japan to 
expand into Taiwan. Finally, there was no reason to support Taiwanese independence 
movements because the government in Taipei did not want an independent Taiwan.136 The 
administration could agree with Beijing on each of these five points without reversing any U.S. 
policies.  
Neither Nixon nor Kissinger believed that agreeing with Beijing on these points was in 
any way detrimental to U.S. relations with the ROC. Nixon did think that others could 
misperceive agreement with Beijing as detrimental to the ROC. He told Kissinger a week before 
the presidential visit that he did not want to give Bill Buckley reason to blame him for selling 
Taiwan down the river, because “we haven’t sold Formosa down the river. We haven’t at all.” 
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Kissinger shrugged off the matter. The national security advisor did not share these concerns 
about public misperception, because it was clear to him that the administration was not making 
any substantive concessions on Taiwan: the five principles were all longstanding U.S. policy.137  
 
Obscuring Disagreement 
 Most communiqués do not use a dialectic format like the Shanghai Communiqué.138 The 
Shanghai Communiqué was organized by topic and set out each side’s unique position, then set 
out areas of agreement. Scholars frequently criticize the U.S. position on Taiwan as being too 
weak in stating U.S. interests and too conciliatory toward Beijing.139 From the beginning, 
however, the administration had not wanted to state clear positions. The unique format was the 
product of reconciling what Beijing wanted out of the communiqué and what the United States 
wanted.  Beijing wanted the communiqué to bluntly delineate disagreements. Washington 
wanted it to obscure disagreements.  
The White House’s strategy for the meetings in Beijing was designed to signal to the 
PRC leadership that Nixon understood their perspectives and needs. Kissinger’s briefings to 
Nixon emphasized the importance of demonstrating to Mao and Zhou that he understood their 
interests and their need to placate their domestic constituencies.140 Nixon obviously took that 
lesson to heart. While in Beijing, in regards to Taiwan, Nixon told Zhou  
I know the Prime Minister…has a problem. This is an issue which basically is an irritant 
and has a high emotional content and therefore he needs to show progress on the issue. 
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That’s his side, and I recognize this. I am taking that into consideration as to what we can 
say in the joint communiqué.141 
 
Nixon reinforced how well he could identify with Zhou’s need to placate his domestic audiences 
by drawing parallels with his own domestic challenges. While the Americans would do their best 
to be as conciliatory as possible towards Beijing’s stance on Taiwan, they needed to make their 
own position clear, or else they might give Nixon’s opponents “the opportunity to gang up and 
say in effect that the American President went to [Beijing] and sold Taiwan down the river.” The 
communiqué needed to adequately placate the PRC’s public and the U.S. public.142  
 This logic was exactly same as that the State Department had used in 1969 to reassure the 
ROC that the end of the Taiwan Strait Patrol did not represent a change in U.S. policy. Nixon 
assured Zhou that his intentions were to normalize relations with Beijing; unfortunately, 
domestic factors outside his control forced him to pursue that intention in a way that, at first 
glance, might make it seem as if his desire to open relations with the PRC was insincere. Many 
scholars reference Nixon’s complaints to Zhou and Mao about domestic political constraints as 
evidence that Nixon wanted to open ties with Beijing but was forced to maintain ties with Taipei. 
This reasoning puts too much faith in Nixon’s comments to the PRC leaders. The State 
Department had made the same claims to the ROC less than three years earlier: that the United 
States was committed to defend Taiwan but domestic budgetary constraints forced the U.S. Navy 
to withdraw from the Taiwan Strait. Just because Nixon told Zhou that he was obligated by 
domestic politics to stand by the ROC does not mean that was his only motivation for avoiding 
making concessions on Taiwan. From the beginning, the administration’s strategy for the 
Shanghai Communiqué was to avoid making specific commitments.  
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 Kissinger took a draft statement to Beijing in October 1971 that he intended to “glide 
over differences and emphasize common ground.”143 NSC staffer John Holdridge had drafted it 
based on standard communiqués released after similar presidential visits.144 As an example of 
just how vague the administration intended the statement to be, the draft Kissinger first handed to 
Zhou made no reference to Taiwan, Vietnam, Korea, or South Asia in general. Zhou Enlai 
agreed to use the draft as a basis for discussion, but Kissinger quickly realized that it would not 
last long in its current state. The Chinese and the Americans had very different ideas of what the 
communiqué’s purpose was and how it should be written. “[Zhou’s] emphasis was on a sharp 
delineation of our respective positions,” Kissinger reported to Nixon. “My objectives were to 
dilute the rhetoric and shorten the length of opposing views, and expand areas of agreement.”145 
Those two positions would prove very difficult to reconcile.  
 Zhou presented Kissinger with an alternative draft that was more acceptable to Beijing. It 
bore no resemblance to the American draft. Kissinger was dismayed that “there was almost no 
mention of agreed principles” anywhere in the PRC version. This belligerence was symptomatic 
of the entire document. In one famous incident, an incredulous Kissinger explained to Zhou that 
no “American President [could] sign a document which said that revolution had become the 
irresistible trend of history or that ‘the people’s revolutionary struggles are just.’” Specifically, it 
identified Taiwan as “‘the crucial issue’ obstructing normalization of bilateral relations” and tied 
normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing to an agreement on Taiwan’s 
status.146 
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 Though the United States ended up adopting Zhou’s dialectic format, Kissinger 
consistently worked to moderate the language and expand on areas of agreement. In response to 
Zhou saying sovereignty over Taiwan was the key dispute between Washington and Beijing, 
Kissinger’s second draft said that all Chinese recognized that Taiwan is part of China.147 This 
wording would find its way into the final draft. The White House had not wanted to take a 
position on Taiwan and, in negotiating with the PRC over the wording, continued trying to avoid 
doing so.  
 
“…there is but one China and…Taiwan is a part of China”148 
  The Taiwan section begins by acknowledging that Taiwan is part of China. This is 
arguably the most controversial statement of the section because it is used as evidence that Nixon 
tacitly agreed that Beijing was the rightful government of Taiwan.149 The statement was not all 
that remarkable, however, because even the ROC agreed that “Taiwan is part of China.”150 In 
making this statement, Nixon chose the lowest common denominator: he articulated U.S. policy 
as only that on which everyone agreed.  
 The real dispute was whether Beijing or Taipei was the legitimate government of China. 
The White House avoided this issue entirely by using wordplay to create ambiguity. Nixon and 
Kissinger talked with the PRC leaders only about Taiwan the island, and rarely about the ROC 
the country. Upon return from Nixon’s February visit to Beijing, Kissinger met with the ROC’s 
ambassador to the United States. Kissinger was apparently taken off guard by the diplomat’s 
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assertion that the United States had made a critical error in only referring to “Taiwan” and never 
to “the Republic of China” in the communiqué. The ambassador told the national security 
advisor that not mentioning the ROC implied it was not a legitimate government. Kissinger 
acknowledged the misunderstanding, but impressed upon the ambassador that “Taiwan” referred 
only to the “geographical entity,” thus avoiding the question of ROC legitimacy entirely.151 
While in Beijing, Nixon himself consistently avoided commenting on the political identity of 
Taiwan. When Zhou pressured him on it, he changed the subject. 
 
“…a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question”152 
 The Taiwan section next called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the ROC 
and the PRC. That line was really there for appearances’ sake; it would look bad for the 
administration not to support peaceful conflict resolution. Calls for a peaceful resolution were 
actually disguised support for the status quo. Spontaneous peaceful settlement of the Chinese 
civil war was unlikely, and the United States was still committed to defend the ROC against an 
attack by Beijing. Thus, with both possible avenues for resolving the conflict closed off, the 
status quo was effectively perpetuated.  
 The call for a peaceful solution was just for appearances, because the administration’s 
behavior reveals a three-pronged effort to make sure that the Shanghai Communiqué represented 
a continuation of the status quo and not the first steps towards the PRC absorbing Taiwan. The 
first prong was to call for a peaceful settlement without trying to bring the two sides together. 
The second was to tell the ROC that the administration would not pressure them to negotiate 
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with the PRC, and the third was to reaffirm the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. The whole effort 
rested on the White House’s assessment that Beijing would always claim the right to forcibly 
oust Chiang Kai-shek and his government from Taiwan. In fact, at one point Rogers had 
proposed that the communiqué include a renunciation of force by the PRC, but Kissinger 
denounced that idea as “inconceivable,” and Nixon agreed to move ahead without that 
provision.153  
When the Shanghai Communiqué called for “a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves,”154 the United States said it was up to Beijing and Taipei to 
determine between them which government was legitimate by negotiating. The ROC and the 
PRC were still parties in a civil war, and their leaders referred to each other as “bandits.”155 
Spontaneous negotiations were not imminent, and commencing them was not a priority for the 
administration. Nixon and Kissinger made it clear to the ROC that the administration would take 
no initiative in bringing Beijing and Taipei together. After he returned to Washington, Nixon 
reassured the ROC’s ambassador to the United States that unlike in the Israeli-Arab conflict, the 
administration had no desire to mediate an end to the PRC-ROC conflict.156  
The Nixon administration would not even quietly pressure its ally to negotiate. Kissinger 
told both the ROC ambassador in Washington and the ROC Foreign Minister that the 
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administration discouraged them from negotiating with the Communists.157 As the national 
security advisor explained to the ROC’s foreign minister, the administration called for a peaceful 
settlement so as to placate international opinion. The administration would not put pressure on 
the ROC to negotiate, so the likelihood of peaceful negotiations was next to none. Further, as 
part of calling for peaceful negotiations, the United States had said it would not allow the issue to 
be settled by force,158 which was reinforced by its obligation under the 1954 Mutual Defense 
Treaty to defend the ROC against attack. In effect, the administration had made both possible 
methods of resolving the dispute over the ROC’s legitimacy untenable. They had cemented the 
status quo. 
Actually, the Shanghai Communiqué had almost renounced the 1954 defense treaty. 
Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Marshall Green had been given the final draft of the communiqué the day before it was supposed 
to be released. Green found a problem. The administration reaffirmed its defense treaties with 
Korea and Japan, but the Taiwan section made no mention of defense treaties. In the 1950s, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson had made a speech outlining a U.S. “defense perimeter” in the 
Pacific that did not include Korea. A few months later, North Korea invaded South Korea. 
Traditional wisdom held that Acheson’s omission of Korea from U.S. defense commitments had 
signaled to the North Koreans that the Truman administration would not get involved in a 
Korean conflict.159 Worried about history repeating itself, Green got in touch with Rogers. 
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Rogers phoned Nixon’s suite, and Bob Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, answered the phone. 
Haldeman refused to wake Nixon and hung up on the Secretary of State.160 
Green, infuriated that the administration was about to make a major diplomatic gaffe, ran 
into Ron Ziegler, Nixon’s press aide. Green explained the error to him. In his memoirs, Green 
posits that Ziegler told Haldeman, who then decided to tell Nixon. When Nixon heard about the 
inconsistency he was irate. In his memoirs, Kissinger writes that Nixon was upset the State 
Department decided to “nitpick” the document, and was afraid they would go about “bad-
mouthing the Communiqué.” Green’s memoirs say that Nixon was upset at Kissinger for not 
having noticed the inconsistency before, and “having put him on the spot” within hours of the 
communiqué’s release.161 
Green’s guess at the reason behind Nixon’s anger is likely more accurate than Kissinger’s 
since Nixon himself had spotted the same inconsistency as Green a week before. Kissinger 
convinced him that it was not a serious issue, since Taiwan was addressed in a separate section 
from Korea and Japan. Nixon comforted himself by emphasizing that the U.S. defense treaty 
with the ROC still implicitly backed the communiqué.162 So U.S. forces may withdraw from 
Taiwan, but the ROC would still be militarily allied with the United States against any Beijing 
attack. The administration balanced the omission of the treaty from the communiqué by having 
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“…the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations”164  
Finally, the Taiwan section declared the United States’ intention of withdrawing its 
troops from the island. Though the defense treaty was still in place, withdrawing U.S. troops 
seemed to be a sign of abandoning Taiwan. However, Nixon repeatedly emphasized to Zhou that 
this military withdrawal from Taiwan would happen “regardless” of any reciprocal actions on the 
PRC’s part.165 Nixon was not subordinating military policy to diplomacy, but using military 
decisions as diplomatic capital. This is the same thing the White House did when the Navy 
cancelled the Taiwan Strait Patrol. Recall that the Pentagon cancelled the patrol as part of a 
larger program of defense spending cuts. Kissinger and the State Department used the planned 
military withdrawal as a signal of the administration’s peaceful intentions toward Beijing.  
While in Beijing, Nixon used assurances of U.S. troops withdrawals from Taiwan to 
avoid commenting on the island’s political status. At one point, Zhou aggressively confronted 
Nixon on the disagreement between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan. Kissinger had once 
mentioned that resolving the Taiwan issue could take ten years. Ten years was too long, Zhou 
argued. The prime minister wanted a resolution much sooner, and offered to take out Chiang 
Kai-shek.166 Kissinger had warned Nixon that the PRC premier was capable of frank outbursts 
like this. “You should not let such statements stand but rather respond very firmly,” he had 
counseled.167  
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Nixon’s “firm response” was to change the subject. He assured the prime minister that his 
goal was normalization of relations. Taiwan of course was a critical point of contention they 
needed to work out as part of any normalization process. To that end, Nixon was willing to make 
certain concessions to Beijing. He went on to assure Zhou that “with regard to Taiwan I do not 
believe a permanent American presence—whatever happens at our meetings—is necessary to 
American security,” and thus he intended to withdraw U.S. military forces from the island. He 
treated Zhou to a lengthy discussion of the impact that domestic political opinion and the needs 
of the Vietnam War would have on the speed at which U.S. troops would leave Taiwan, but 
concluded by reiterating that a U.S. drawdown was inevitable.168 Zhou had talked about political 
authority over Taiwan; Nixon countered with a discussion about withdrawing U.S. forces. They 
were related topics since U.S. forces were largely credited with keeping the PRC military from 
invading the island, but they were also subtly different, especially in light of the fact that these 
discussions did not cover the matter of the United States’ defense treaty with the ROC.  
 
Conclusion 
 In terms of the policy product, the Shanghai Communiqué was the result of a concerted 
effort to reduce U.S. policy on Taiwan to the lowest common denominator, to only those facts on 
which Nixon and Kissinger believed everyone from Mao Zedong to Chiang Kai-shek to Bill 
Buckley could agree. Crafting such a policy was an incredibly difficult endeavor. The nature of 
the stalemated Chinese civil war meant that Beijing and Taipei were both alert to any diplomatic 
actions that might comment on either’s legitimacy. Both wanted to be recognized as “the sole 
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legitimate government of all China,” of both the mainland and Taiwan.169 By avoiding any 
mention of the ROC, strategically using meaningless idealistic calls for a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict, and emphasizing areas of agreement while downplaying substantive disputes, Nixon 
and Kissinger sought to turn the Shanghai Communiqué into a summary of their three-year 
balancing act of relations with both Chinese governments. They sought to create a policy that 
everyone could agree on.  
In terms of the policymaking process, the communiqué was the result of a centralized 
process that is unique in the history of Taiwan policymaking during the first Nixon 
administration. Nixon and Kissinger entirely controlled the drafting process: the national security 
advisor negotiated the wording with the PRC’s Vice Foreign Minister, and he cleared the drafts 
only with the president. Yet even in this instance, at a critical moment, Nixon listened to the 
advice of the State Department even though it contradicted Kissinger’s advice. Contrary to 
Gaddis’s assertion that the White House cut the foreign policy bureaucracy out of the 
policymaking process to the detriment of relations with countries other than the USSR and 
PRC,170 in terms of Taiwan policymaking the White House did utilize the expertise of the State 
Department, and the Department frequently played a key role in determining the content of the 
final policy. Secretary of State Dean Acheson omitted Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter 
and is frequently blamed for giving the North Koreans the confidence to invade South Korea; 
when Green and Rogers convinced Nixon to change the wording of the Shanghai Communiqué 
so that it did not imply a renunciation of the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC, they 
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could arguably have preempted the possibility of a similar oversight. How the administration 
made its Taiwan policy was important in determining what the content of that policy was.  
 The Taiwan section of the Shanghai Communiqué ended up being a smokescreen. It was 
the culmination of the first Nixon administration’s Taiwan policy because it put on paper what 
they had been trying to do in practice since 1969: the communiqué obscured the fundamental 
disputes between Beijing and Washington in the hopes of maintaining the status quo for as long 
as possible. By maintaining the status quo, Nixon took another step toward achieving his goal of 
remaking relations with Beijing while preserving ties with Taipei. In that sense, the Shanghai 
Communiqué was détente on paper. The détente grand strategy was founded on recognizing 
geopolitical realities and working inside the confines of that reality;171 it affirmed existing U.S. 
commitments and called for eased tensions with the Communist powers. The Shanghai 
Communiqué acknowledged the reality that both Chinese governments claimed there was only 
one China; it cemented the status quo of relations with Taipei by preempting all possible 
methods of reuniting Taiwan with the mainland, and it signaled a coming normalization of 
relations between Washington and Beijing.  
That outcome was not predetermined in any sense. Nixon and Kissinger struggled during 
the course of negotiations with the PRC to draft a communiqué that met their goals and 
convinced Beijing they were serious about normalizing relations. In order to do both, the 
president and his national security advisor sought to limit U.S. policy to the lowest common 
denominator by finding and taking a stand on only those positions on which everyone agreed. 
Reactions to that policy were mixed, especially at home. Barry Goldwater, the conservative U.S. 
senator and former GOP presidential candidate, supported Nixon’s initiatives toward Beijing; 
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Bill Buckley did not.172 Historians argue the communiqué reflected Nixon’s acquiescence to 
Beijing’s demands.173 Yet understanding what the Taiwan section says about the island is only 
part of understanding the policies hidden in the communiqué’s language. The other part of 
understanding the Taiwan section is in understanding how Nixon and Kissinger arrived that 
wording and how they acted on the policies the communiqué appeared to articulate.  
The full story of how the Nixon administration drafted the Shanghai Communiqué 
demonstrates that it was another moment when the administration tried to implement détente on 
the tactical level. They sought to signal a new era of relations with Beijing and preserve their 
existing commitments to the ROC in the same document, thus reconciling the internal 
contradiction between détente’s requirement of normalized relations with Beijing and the Nixon 
Doctrine’s reaffirmation of U.S. treaty commitments, including the commitment to Taipei. In 
Beijing in February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger sought to balance relations with the PRC and 
ROC by limiting U.S. policy to the lowest common denominator and articulating a policy 
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In 1998, Winston Lord, Kissinger’s special assistant, was interviewed as part of the State 
Department’s oral history program. When asked about Nixon and Kissinger’s attitude toward 
Taiwan in this period, he had this to say:  
From the very beginning, and this is reflected in the Shanghai Communiqué, the strategy 
was…to postpone resolution of the Taiwan issue…. So we needed to devise an 
approach…that would preserve Beijing’s position and preserve our interests. The idea 
was to keep working on the Taiwan issue, but we would kick it down the road for later 
resolution.174 
 
Nixon, Lord said, believed that he had “to take some risks in that relationship [with the ROC], in 
order to move ahead with [the People’s Republic of] China.”175 The goal was to normalize 
relations with Beijing while not damaging relations with Taipei.  
 Achieving that goal would allow the administration to ideally implement détente. If the 
administration could balance relations with Beijing and Taipei, then they would fulfill the Nixon 
Doctrine’s affirmation of all U.S. treaty commitments and their desire to remake relations with 
Beijing, which was critical to transitioning the Cold War from a military conflict to a diplomatic 
conflict and, eventually, to a thing of the past. Normalized relations between Washington and 
Beijing would give the United States greater diplomatic leverage over the Soviet Union. 
Normalization would also reduce the likelihood of a U.S.-PRC war, thus making Nixon’s vision 
of a global military drawdown, a political necessity at home, less of a capitulation to Moscow 
and more of a strategic shift in how the United States fought the Cold War. Beijing, however, 
wanted the United States to renounce its relationship with the Republic of China, which would 
violate the Nixon Doctrine. Faced with this contradiction, Nixon and his administration sought to 
have it both ways by balancing relations with both Chinese governments.  
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 As Lord suggested, and foreign policy historians have argued, Nixon had no long-term 
plan for how to implement détente.176 He and his administration were making it up as they went 
along. Nixon had a vision of where he wanted to end up (partnership with Beijing and Moscow, 
a smaller global military footprint for the United States, and the transformation of the Cold War 
from a primarily military conflict to a primarily diplomatic one). He did not know how the 
details of détente would work out. The status of Taiwan and the ROC was one of those details. 
Could the United States maintain relations with the ROC while opening relations with Beijing? 
Nixon wanted to. Would it be possible? The administration did not answer that question up front. 
On the contrary, Nixon and his administration expended a great deal of effort to balance relations 
with both governments, putting off a resolution of the issue until it became impossible to do so.  
 The entire foreign policy apparatus, from the Defense Department to the State 
Department to the White House, worked to create policies that would implement Nixon’s 
strategy. They sent different signals to Beijing and Taipei, searched for a combination of policies 
that would adequately convince both Chinese governments that the United States was their 
friend, and obscured the key disputes between Beijing and Washington in order to give the 
appearance of common ground on which to build a new relationship. At no time was the 
administration’s course predetermined; there were numerous alternative policies Washington 
could have adopted at every turn. In 1969, the State Department was sending all sorts of signals 
to Beijing, trying to see which would stick. In 1971, Nixon could have decided to lose the UN 
vote on purpose, as Spiro Agnew wanted, or to welcome the PRC into the Security Council and 
hope that the world would forget the ROC was still a UN member, as William Rogers wanted. In 
1972, Washington could have released a joint statement with Beijing that said nothing 
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substantive whatsoever about the future of U.S.-PRC relations, or it could have accidentally 
renounced its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taipei. Consistently, Nixon’s active intervention was 
the determining factor in why the administration pursued the course of action it did. Washington 
was not successful every time it tried to balance Beijing and Taipei; the United States was not 
able to keep the ROC in the UN. When Nixon returned from Beijing in 1972, however, the 
United States was maintaining relations with both Chinese governments.  
 The Nixon China policy was interrupted, however, when Richard Nixon resigned in 
August 1974 without having fully normalized relations with Beijing. In 1979, Jimmy Carter 
recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate Chinese government and severed 
official diplomatic ties with the ROC.177 As part of the agreement with Beijing, arms sales to 
Taipei stopped for one year.178 However, the Carter administration did continue the Nixon-era 
policy of balancing relations with Beijing and Taipei. Before Washington officially recognized 
the PRC, officials at the ROC desk at the State Department had begun drafting a bill that would 
give a legal basis for continuing U.S.-ROC relations after official diplomatic ties were severed. 
Congress passed the Carter administration’s bill as the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.179 Since 
then, Washington has continued to manage parallel relations with both Chinese governments.  
U.S. arms sales to the ROC resumed in 1980 after the moratorium expired and have 
continued.180 Diplomatic cooperation between the United States and Taipei continued as well: 
Taipei offered one of the largest financial contributions to Operation Desert Storm, although the 
George H.W. Bush administration turned down the offer lest it prompt Beijing to veto the 
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invasion in the UN Security Council. Then in 1995, another crisis developed in the Taiwan Strait 
when Beijing tried to influence upcoming elections on Taiwan through intimidation: Beijing 
conducted military exercises involving 150,000 troops and shot rockets into international waters 
around two major ROC ports. The Clinton administration responded by dispatching not one, but 
two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. The George W. Bush administration initially 
prioritized relations with Taipei over relations with Beijing, though the relationship became more 
complicated after 9/11, when the administration sought Beijing’s support in the War on 
Terror.181 
 In the end, Nixon got what he wanted: Washington continues to balance relations with 
Beijing and Taipei. Even détente’s two contradictory goals have been fulfilled: Jimmy Carter 
normalized relations with Beijing, and as the Clinton administration’s response to the 1995 Strait 
crisis suggests, Washington still takes seriously its commitment to defend the ROC against 
Beijing. The bizarre nature of U.S.-China relations today in which the United States manages 
parallel relations with two rival governments began with Richard Nixon’s China policy. The old 
quip “only Nixon could go to China” has become very controversial; historians have argued that 
a Washington-Beijing rapprochement was inevitable.182 Frankly, we cannot know if that is true 
or not with any certainty, because it was Richard Nixon who showed up in Beijing in 1972. He 
and his administration conceptualized and implemented the transition from official relations with 
Taipei to a complex balancing act of relations with Taipei and Beijing. This is the international 
situation that they bequeathed to their successors and that presidents since Nixon have been 
managing and wrestling with in their own particular ways. What we can do is examine and 
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analyze the origins of current U.S.-China relations: why the United States maintains relations 
with Taipei and Beijing today, and what Nixon wanted to accomplish by doing so in the 1970s.  
The origins of Washington’s China balancing act are rooted in détente. During Nixon’s 
first term, the administration’s China policy was an example of détente on the tactical level. The 
détente grand strategy had a key internal contradiction. To fulfill the Nixon Doctrine and 
normalization with the People’s Republic of China, the administration needed to establish ties 
with Beijing and preserve ties with Taipei. Yet both governments jealously guarded their claims 
to be the “sole legitimate government of all China.”183  
 The cancellation of the Taiwan Strait Patrol is an excellent example of how the 
administration managed that internal contradiction. The two destroyers that regularly passed 
through the Taiwan Strait were located at the intersection of implementing the Nixon Doctrine 
and signaling a new era of relations with Beijing and at the intersection of U.S. tension with 
Beijing and solidarity with Taipei. The patrol’s cancellation demonstrates that Taiwan 
policymaking was a dispersed process. The Defense Department worked to implement the Nixon 
Doctrine, while the State Department and White House worked to open relations with the PRC 
and preserve relations with the ROC. That dispersed policymaking process meant that during the 
cancellation of the Taiwan Strait Patrol the administration reconciled the contradiction between 
relations with the ROC and the PRC by trying to have both.  
 The administration’s attempt to prevent the ROC’s expulsion from the UN in 1971 
represents a continuation of balancing relations with both Chinese governments. In this instance, 
however, the challenges to maintaining a balance were far more daunting than they had been two 
years earlier. The State Department warned that support for the ROC’s UN membership was 
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rapidly eroding, and the administration was going to have to fight for its ally’s seat. Yet at the 
same time Beijing responded to the administration’s overtures and appeared willing to move 
toward normalization. If the administration worked too hard to defend Taipei’s UN seat, it might 
derail the critical Beijing initiative; if the administration moved too quickly toward Beijing, it 
might not be able to win enough support for the ROC’s UN membership. Once again, the White 
House was not the only administration entity working on this problem. The State Department 
worked through the spring and summer to find the best options for keeping Taipei in the UN. 
Nixon delayed deciding which option to use until he was certain Beijing would move forward 
with normalization, and then he personally dove into the efforts to defend the ROC’s UN seat. In 
the end, the administration failed to keep the ROC in the UN, but Beijing continued to ease 
tensions with Washington, and the United States preserved its official ties with the ROC. The 
UN vote, then, was more a success than a failure in terms of implementing détente.  
 The Shanghai Communiqué, released at the end of Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in 
February 1972, was the culmination of this period of U.S. Taiwan policy. Sending different 
signals to Beijing and Taipei would not balance relations with both Chinese governments in this 
instance; the administration needed to issue a single statement that would be acceptable to 
Beijing and Taipei. At this critical moment, Nixon and Kissinger took complete control of the 
policymaking process. The national security advisor negotiated with Beijing, and he cleared the 
wording only with the president until the very last minute. Yet even the Shanghai Communiqué 
demonstrates the importance of administration actors who were not Nixon and Kissinger in 
making Taiwan policy. In the final hours before the communiqué’s release, Nixon listened to 
Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary Green’s advice over Kissinger’s and avoided a 




Shanghai Communiqué balanced relations with Taipei and Beijing by limiting U.S. policy to the 
lowest common denominator and articulated a policy on which everyone could agree.  
 Today, Nixon’s Taiwan policy is very controversial. Scholars disagree on whether Nixon 
and Kissinger even wanted to maintain relations with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, 
but the general consensus is that Nixon and Kissinger kicked the ROC to the curb in a mad rush 
to normalize relations with Communist China, hindered only by their fear of political backlash 
for moving too quickly away from the anti-Communist ROC. That narrative implies that détente 
was a coherent foreign policy strategy that conflicted with U.S. domestic political requirements, 
and frames the problem as a contradiction between foreign and domestic policy.  
In fact, Nixon’s Taiwan policy was calculated and deliberate. This revised narrative 
reveals that the status of the ROC and the Taiwan island represented an internal contradiction in 
détente: a contradiction between the Nixon Doctrine and normalization with Beijing. U.S. 
domestic politics undoubtedly played a role in motivating Nixon to preserve ties with Taipei, but 
there is a bigger question here about détente’s coherence as a grand strategy and how the Nixon 
administration dealt with the internal contradiction between the Nixon Doctrine and 
normalization with Communist China. Understanding how the administration made policy 
toward the ROC demonstrates that they worked to reconcile that contradiction and implement 
détente by balancing relations with Taipei and Beijing. Thus Nixon’s Taiwan policy was the 
linchpin of his détente grand strategy. From 1969 to 1971, the administration worked together in 
a dispersed policymaking process to balance relations with both Chinese governments, to uphold 
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